The State v Peters (a/c Buffy) et Al

• Jurisdiction: Trinidad & Tobago
• Judge: Holdip, J.
• Judgment Date: 16 July 2013
• Neutral Citation: TT 2013 HC 210
• Docket Number: CR 12 of 2009
• Court: High Court (Trinidad and Tobago)
• Date: 16 July 2013

High Court

Holdip, J.

CR 12 of 2009

The State

and

Peters (a/c Buffy) et al

Appearances:

Mr. Israel Khan SC, Mr. Gilbert Peterson SC, Ms. Dana Seetahal SC (ABS), Ms. Joy Balkaran appeared on behalf of THE STATE

Mr. Kwasi Bekoe, instructed by Mr. Christian Chandler appeared on behalf of SHERVON PETERS

Mr. Frank Peterson (ABS), instructed by Mr. Nigel Trancoso appeared on behalf of KEIDA GARCIA

Mr. Selwyn Mohammed, instructed by Mrs. Stacy Benjamin-Roach appeared on behalf of MARLON TRIMMINGHAM

Mr. Colin Selvon (ABS), instructed by Ms. Thalia-Megan Francis (ABS) appeared on behalf of EARL TRIMMINGHAM

Mr. Selwyn Ramlal, instructed by Mr. Shervon Noreiga appeared on behalf of RONALD ARMSTRONG

Mr. Ian Brooks (ABS), instructed by Mrs. Stacy Benjamin-Roach appeared on behalf of ANTONIO CHARLES

Mr. Ulric Skerritt, instructed by Mr. Nikolas All appeared on behalf of JOEL FRASER

Mr. Wayne Sturge, instructed by Ms. Viveka Pargas appeared on behalf of LYNDON JAMES

Mr. Wayne Sturge appeared on behalf of ALLAN MARTINS

Mr. Richard Valere (ABS), instructed by Mr. Stephen Wilson (ABS) appeared on behalf of DEVON PETER

Mr. Joseph Pantor (ABS), instructed by Ms. Clydene Crevelle appeared on behalf of ANTHONY DWAYNE GLOSTER

Mr. Lennox Sankersingh, Ms. Lana Lakhan instructed by Mr. Arif Rahrnan (ABS) appeared on behalf of JAMILLE GARCIA

Criminal practice and procedure - Murder — Motion to quash indictment — Whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant committal — Whether there was sufficient evidence for applicant to stand trial — Motion dismissed — Civil practice and procedure — Stay of proceedings — Motion to stay proceedings — Unconstitutionality — Abuse of process — Motion dismissed.

Holdip, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

1 Counsel for the accused No 4 tiled a Motion to Stay Proceedings for unconstitutionality and a Motion to Stay Proceedings on the ground of abuse of process on July 1st 2013. Oral arguments were made before this Honourable Court on July 8th 2013.

2 Counsel for the accused No 5 filed an Application to Quash the Indictment on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a committal on July 1st 2013. Oral arguments were in support of that said application made before this Honourable Court on July 8th 2013.

3 Counsel for the accused No. 7 had filed an Application to Stay Proceedings for Murder on the ground that there is no evidence on the face of the deposition to put the applicant on a trial. This was filed on June 28th 2013 and arguments in support of it were so conducted on the said 8th July.

4 Then we had learned Senior Counsel for the Prosecution, who would have filed a response to the Applications on July 5th 2013, and oral submissions were heard on behalf of those submissions on July 9th 2013.

5 This Court would have considered the submissions and authorities provided by each Defence Counsel and the response by Learned Senior in arriving at its decision. The first consideration would have been to the law:

II. LAW

6 The circumstances in which a Motion to Quash an indictment may be brought, are limited to those outlined in the Blackstone's 2008 Para D11.96 and also Archbold 2013 Paras 1-283 286, 4-74. Blackstone's 2008 edition states that it was generally held that a motion to quash an indictment may be brought in any of the following cases:

• (i) Where the indictment is bad on its face (e.g. for duplicity or because the particulars of a count do not disclose an offence known to law);

• (ii) Where an indictment, or a count thereof, has been preferred without the requisite statutory authority; and

• (iii) Where the indictment contains a count for an offence in respect of which the accused was not committed for trial and the committal documents do not disclose a case to answer for that offence.

III. DEFENCE SUBMISSIONS TO QUASH AN INDICTMENT ON THE GROUND OF INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

7 This Court has considered the arguments put forward by Defence Counsel for accused No. 5, Ronald Armstrong, in relation to the motion to quash the indictment on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

8 Defence Counsel relied primarily on the cases of Neill v. North Antrim Magistrates Court [1992] 4 All ER 846 and Bedwellty Justices, ex parte Williams [1997] AC 225. Counsel submitted that the cumulative effect of these cases approved the exercise by the respective trial judges of their inherent jurisdiction and discretion to not only examine the depositions, but also to enquire into the sufficiency of the evidence therein and to quash, where appropriate, an indictment which was the result of a committal that was based largely on inadmissible, insufficient or no evidence.

9 Counsel for accused No. 5, also submitted at page 4 of his submissions, that the State's case on the papers against the accused. Ronald Armstrong is based exclusively on the evidence of a hostile witness Keon Gloster who was himself arrested by the police but not charged for the offence of murder.

10 Counsel further submitted at page 5 of his submissions that accused No 5, would have submitted himself to police interviews whilst he was in police custody. The first being on May 10th 2007 and the second on May 12th 2007. Counsel submitted that these statements contain no material of an incriminatory nature.

11 Counsel submitted that the deposition does not contain any direct or scientific evidence which may tend to establish the evidential link to connect Ronald Armstrong with the commission of the offence of murder. Due to the absence of direct evidence, the question then becomes whether the remaining elements of the offence of murder (apart from the fact of death) on the State's case against the accused No.5 may reasonably be inferred from any circumstantial evidence that may exist on the deposition so as to fill the inferential gap between the evidence on the deposition and those who may have participated in the demise of the deceased.

12 Counsel made further submissions at page 12, as regard to a prima facie case being made out that accused No 5 was participating in the joint venture to commit any arrestable offence to wit kidnapping and/or to imprisonment of the deceased, in consequence of which she met her death. Counsel submitted that the evidence on deposition does not trigger the felony/murder rule against accused No 5.

13 In addition, Defence Counsel for accused No 5, relied on the authorities of R v. Clarkson (1971) 55 Cr App R 445. at page 19 of their submissions, in submitting that the presence of accused No 5 at the scene of a crime cannot amount to encouragement.

14 Defence Counsel for the accused No 5 further went on to submit at Page 24 of their submissions, that due to the insufficiency of evidence on the deposition, the State would not be able to demonstrate on the evidence that there is a case against the accused. Ronald Armstrong with respect to his involvement in the offence of murder on any legal bases since they could not rule out the possibility that the facts as they now stand, are such as to be inconsistent with any other rational conclusion than that of guilt. Counsel submitted that it would therefore be oppressive and unfair to accused No 5 to allow the Prosecution to pursue its Indictment as it leads to demonstrable injustice.

15 Defence Counsel for accused No. 4 Mr. Selvon, has submitted at page 3 of its unnumbered submissions that the issue for the Court as it relates to accused No. 4 Earl Trimmingham on the face of the deposition is the extent to which the details of his presence at the scene presents sufficient information to leave to the jury to allow them to draw the necessary inference of participation, to wit, aiding and/or abetting.

IV. PROSECUTION SUBMISSIONS

16 Learned Senior Counsel for the State submitted that the authors of Blackstone and Archbold have set out the circumstances in which a motion to quash an indictment may be brought. Senior Counsel stated that they pertain to where an indictment on its face is bad; where there is no valid committal/the indictment in that there is a breach of the statute authorizing it; or in limited circumstances where the committal is based on inadmissible evidence.

17 Learned Senior referred this Honourable Court to the case of K v. Chairman, County of London Quarter Sessions, Ex Parte Downes [1954] 1 Q.B. 1 in which a three judge panel in the Divisional Court held that a Court is not entitled to quash an indictment on the grounds that it is anticipated that the evidence disclosed in the depositions does not appear to be sufficient to support the charge. The only basis on which a Court can examine the depositions before arraignment is to see whether a count included after committal is disclosed on the depositions. This was the reasoning by Lord Goddard at page 6 of that Judgment.

18 On examination, it appears that this principle would have remained the law and was only qualified to an extent when the House of Lords held that leave to move for judicial review to quash committal proceedings is only allowed where there is a really substantial error leading to a demonstrable injustice: And this was basically the raison d'être in the case of Neill v. North Antrim Magistrates' Court [1992] 4 All ER 846 HL. In that particular case, again the Divisional Court of the first instance in the judicial review proceedings had found that the witness statements of the only two eyewitnesses to the case were inadmissible as being not in compliance with the statute under which they were tendered. The statements were tendered in the absence of the witnesses on the basis that they refused to give evidence through “fear”. Proof of that condition came from police officers who had not spoken to the witnesses, but had got the information from the mother. The House agreed this was inadmissible hearsay evidence and held that the magistrate's decision to commit was based on important...