The State v Jay Chandler

• Jurisdiction: Trinidad & Tobago
• Court: High Court (Trinidad and Tobago)
• Judge: Justice Lisa Ramsumair-Hinds
• Judgment Date: 29 October 2024
• Neutral Citation: TT 2024 HC 261
• Docket Number: CR-HC-POS-IND-466-2023-1

The State

and

Jay Chandler

For

Murder

Before

The Honourable Justice Lisa Ramsumair-Hinds

CR-HC-POS-IND-466-2023-1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

Criminal Division

Appearances:

Ms. C. Samuel and Ms. G. Guy for the State.

Mr. G. Ramdeen, Mr. W. Sturge and Mr. D. Harripaul for the Prisoner.

RE-SENTENCING RULING

INTRODUCTION

1 By an Indictment filed on 25 July 2007, the Prisoner Mr Jay Chandler was charged with the offence of murder. The particulars are that, some 20 years ago, on 8 October 2004, at Arouca, in the County of St George, Mr Chandler murdered Mr Kirn Phillip.

2 On 17 August 2011, Mr Chandler was convicted of murder. He was sentenced to death by hanging. On 12 December 2013 the Court of Appeal (Weekes, Soo Hon and Narine JJA) upheld both his conviction and his sentence. He was granted permission to appeal against conviction to the Board and sought unsuccessfully to rely on medical and psychiatric evidence which had not been led at trial, but which he argued tended to show that he might have had a defence of diminished responsibility available to him at trial. On 12 March 2018, the Board dismissed his appeal against conviction. 1 On 16 May 2022, the Board also dismissed his motion challenging the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty. 2

3 On 18 August 2023, Justice Margaret Mohammed transferred his matter to the Assizes for re-sentencing. The Judge's complete order is as follows:

• (i) The Court declares that the carrying out or any attempt to carry out the sentence of death imposed upon the Claimant on 17 August, 2011 by the Respondent, its servants and or agents, will constitute a contravention of the Claimant's rights guaranteed under Sections 4 (a), (b) and 5 (2) (b) of the Constitution;

• (ii) The Court declares that the continued detention of the Claimant on death row awaiting execution under a sentence of death

  subsequent to 17 February 2015 constitutes a breach of his fundamental rights protected by Sections 4 (a), (b) and 5 (2) (b) of the Constitution such as may be compensated in damages;

• (iii) The sentence of death imposed upon the Claimant on 17 August, 2011 be and is hereby forthwith vacated;

• (iv) The Court directs that the Respondent, its servants and or agents do take all steps and actions and make all arrangements to forthwith remove the Claimant from death row and convey him to an appropriate place to await his resentencing;

• (v) The Claimant's resentencing is referred as a matter of urgency to the Registrar of the Supreme Court to have the said issue determined by a Judge sitting in the Criminal Assizes;

• (vi) The damages due to the Claimant for the breaches of the Claimant's constitutional rights as declared by this Court are to be assessed by this Court in default of agreement;

• (vii) The Respondent to file and serve its affidavit in response with respect to the assessment of damages on or before on or before 30 November 2023;

• (viii) The costs of the claim are to be determined by the Court in default of agreement;

• (ix) The Respondent do pay to the Claimant the costs of the Notice of Application for Interim Relief certified fit for one Counsel which are to be assessed by a Registrar in default of agreement;

• (x) The Claimant to file and serve Affidavit to address new matters on or before 8 January 2024; and

• (xi) The Assessment of Damages is scheduled for 19 January 2024 at 11:45 am via a virtual hearing.

4 The details of the murder are reflected in the Privy Council decision and are as follows: On 8 October 2004, Mr Chandler and now deceased Mr Phillip were both remand prisoners at Golden Grove Remand Prison, Arouca. At about 11 am on 8 October, prisoners who were going to have visits from members of the public that day were brought to the holding bay, and called individually by name to line up in the centre of the remand yard, where they were to be searched and handcuffed. Mr Phillip had been searched and was standing at the end of the line of prisoners, near to Prison Officer Mohammed. Mr Chandler was the last prisoner to be called. According to the State, as Mr Chandler approached Officer Mohammed, he lunged towards Mr Phillip and then pursued him across the yard to the gate of the south wing. He had a metal object in his hand with which he was making upward, downward and sideways movements towards the back of Mr Phillip. He came within one to two feet of Mr Phillip before Mr Phillip ran through the gate to the south wing of the prison. Mr Chandler was then cornered by prison officers, and, after being restrained by an officer, he dropped the metal object, which was discovered to be an improvised knife. Mr Phillip was found to have a chest wound and taken to the Arima Health Facility, where he was pronounced dead on arrival. The cause of death was a stab wound to the chest. The State's case was that the wound had been inflicted by Mr Chandler. There were two trials. At his first trial in March 2009, the Prisoner gave evidence. This trial ended with a hung jury. At the second trial, beginning in June 2011, Mr Chandler did not himself give evidence nor did he call any witnesses. His case, as put in cross-examination, was a denial that he had a weapon and that he stabbed Mr Phillip, the implication being that Mr Phillip had been stabbed by another prisoner after he entered the south wing, and that the case against him had been fabricated by the authorities.

APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

5 Since Naresh Boodram v The State 3, it is clear that the Court has a number of options in re-sentencing persons, where by operation of law, the death penalty must be commuted.

6 In the Court of Appeal 4 decision of Naresh Boodram, the Honourable Chief Justice considered a number of cases where death sentences had been commuted to life imprisonment and observed an inconsistency of approach and a lack of clarity as to what life imprisonment meant in practice. His Lordship also considered case law from other jurisdictions and concluded at para 44:

“… simply resorting to the imposition of ‘life imprisonment’ brings neither clarity, proportionality nor certainty to the exercise of fashioning an appropriate remedy under section 14 of the Constitution. The Court must be specific in articulating the punishment it intends to impose, and if it wishes to leave open the possibility of some flexibility after further consideration at a later stage, should say so. For the reasons that are articulated in the paragraphs that follow next, we are fortified in our conclusion that the Court has a discretion to order either life imprisonment with a tariff, a specific term of years or to be detained at the Court's pleasure [with review at specified intervals].”

7 The Court of Appeal held that resentencing following commutation of a death sentence required judges to consider whether the punitive element

of the sentence had been satisfied, and whether the offender had been rehabilitated to the point where they could safely be reintegrated into society. Archie CJ noted:

“To this end, we hold that the Court in exercising its original jurisdiction under Section 14 has the discretion to take into account normal sentencing factors on the vacating of the death sentence. The imposition of a mandatory death sentence is already in and of itself arbitrary and in violation of the Constitution and the Charter of Inter American Human Rights to which this country is a signatory. To be clear, although the expression ‘judicial commutation’ has been used, the Court, in fashioning a remedy under Section 14, is not engaged in the exercise of the prerogative of mercy. It is, in fact, re-sentencing the Applicant in recognition of the fact that he has already been partly punished by reason of having endured the mental anguish of being on death row for an inordinately long period. The Court must therefore ask itself what additional punishment, if any, would be appropriate in the particular circumstances.” (para. 23)

“There is no logical reason why the sentence of life imprisonment should be imposed carte blanche upon every person who has their sentence commuted. That is inherently arbitrary and potentially disproportionate. The circumstances of each murder are different and a Court properly seised of the relevant facts would be able to substitute the appropriate sentence.” (para. 24)

“ A resentencing court must ascertain whether the punitive element of the sentence has been satisfied and also, whether the appellant has been rehabilitated and is safe for reintegration into society. To ascertain the latter, the court has to be provided with evidence that would answer that question either in the affirmative or negative.” (para. 51)

8 Indeed, there are several sentencing options open to me and it is clear from the guidance noted above that I must consider the appropriate punitive element of sentencing first. In this respect, I kept the well-established guidance of our Court of Appeal in Aguillera, Ballai, Ballai and Ayow v The State 5, and the Benjamin v R 6 in view, as well as the need to establish proportionality.

9 The five principal objects of sentencing set out in Benjamin v R bear repeating:

• i. The retributive or denunciatory, which is the same as the punitive;

• ii. The deterrent vis-à-vis potential offenders;

• iii. The deterrent vis-à-vis the particular offender then being sentenced;

• iv. The preventative, which aims at preventing the particular offender from again offending by incarcerating him for a long period; and

• v. The rehabilitative, which contemplates the rehabilitation of the particular offender so that he might resume his place as a law-abiding member of society. 7

10 In Aguillera et al v The State, the overall sentencing structure is as follows:

• i. The calculation of the starting point which takes into account the aggravating and mitigating factors of the offence only; these are the objective circumstances which...