The Promotion Advisory Board v Sophia Narine

• Jurisdiction: Trinidad & Tobago
• Court: Court of Appeal (Trinidad and Tobago)
• Judge: Rajkumar, J.A.,Henderson, J.A.
• Judgment Date: 20 February 2026
• Neutral Citation: TT 2026 CA 13
• Year: 2026
• Docket Number: Suit No.: Civil Appeal No. P128 of 2023

The Promotion Advisory Board

and

Sophia Narine

Rajkumar, J.A.; Henderson, J.A.; Rahim, J.A.

Suit No.: Civil Appeal No. P128 of 2023

Court of Appeal

Ms. A Ramdular, Mr. S Jaikaran, instructed by Ms. K. Matthew, Ms. A. Ramsook for the Appellant.

Mr. A. Ramlogan S.C., Mr. J Jagroo, instructed by Ms. A. Ramdass for the Respondent.

I have read the judgment of Rajkumar, J.A. I agree with it and I have nothing to add.

Ricky Rahim

Justice of Appeal

BACKGROUND

Rajkumar, J.A.

1 The respondent is a Police Officer. On October 10, 2020, she attended an interview for promotion to the rank of Inspector before the Promotion Advisory Board (the Board). The Board is empowered under statute to inter alia, interview officers who had been recommended for promotion and make recommendations to the Commissioner of Police (the Commissioner) in relation to promotions. In the course of that interview, held virtually, she claimed to have felt unwell. The interview was then terminated without the respondent having responded fully to the three questions which comprised the interview. She requested that she be “re-interviewed”. On December 10th 2020, (which was the last day for interviews), she was informed by Ms. Lewis, on behalf of the Board, that the Commissioner had decided not to permit her to be re-interviewed. On 6 January 2021, she received a response from the Legal Unit of the Police Service to a pre-action protocol letter issued on her behalf. It was indicated therein that “It is neither the policy nor practice of the Promotion Advisory Board to permit officers to be re-interviewed”. As a result, she was placed at number 405 out of 485 candidates on the Order of Merit List (OML) dated December 15, 2020.

THE POLICY

2 The policy now enunciated by the Board is that no re-interviews would be permitted. There were reasons supplied for that policy identified in the judgment of the Trial Judge and set out later herein. Both parties accepted that the Board was purporting to apply such a policy. However, the Respondent challenged both the policy and its application to her.

3 i) The respondent contended (and the Trial Judge agreed and so declared) that the defendant's policy and practice not to permit officers to be re-interviewed was unfair, irrational and illegal.

ii) She also contended that, prior to receiving the communication on December 10th above, she had been told by Ms. Lewis, as the head of the Board, in a conversation (the alleged conversation) that she would be re-interviewed. This was not accepted by the appellant.

iii) She claimed that prior to December 10th, there had been no communication of this policy by the Board.

iv) She contended that, in any event, the application of such a policy in a rigid manner without affording any room for the exercise of a discretion as to its application or dis-application in individual cases, amounted to an illegal fettering of discretion.

v) She also contends that the Board, in referring the decision as to whether to “re-interview” the respondent to the Commissioner of Police, had wrongfully delegated its discretion, which was vested solely in it by statute.

4 The appellant contends that before those issues could even be considered, one must first identify the source of any such discretion. It contends that while there is a function/power vested in the Board with respect to the conduct of interviews, there was no discretion vested in it in this regard. Therefore, the question of the fettering of any such discretion simply did not arise, nor did the abdication of any decision-making power with respect to re-interviews, because there was no function/power vested in the Board to re-interview.

5 Save for the alleged conversation, the details of what transpired at the interview and the precise chronology of its commencement and termination are not relevant to the outcome of this appeal. That is because their relevance or otherwise to the exercise of any discretion by the Board, if such discretion existed at all, would be a matter for the Board itself. In any event, they are adequately and comprehensively set out in the written judgment by the Trial Judge. A court would therefore be concerned on this Appeal only with the issue of whether such a power/discretion to re-interview existed, and if so, whether the manner of its exercise infringed any aspect of law.

6 It is curious that if such a policy existed, it was incompatible with the evidence of Ms. Lewis that she had made a recommendation to the Commissioner that the respondent could be afforded the opportunity to be re-interviewed. Further, this policy:

Nevertheless, the issues had to be addressed in the context of the premise of both parties and the trial judge that such a policy in fact existed.

• i) was never communicated to the respondent;

• ii) was never published;

• iii) was only enunciated months after the situation arose for its purported application; and

• iv) when eventually communicated, it emanated from the office of the Commissioner and not from the Board itself.

ISSUES

7 The issues that arise on this appeal include the following:

• i) Whether the policy of the Board was illegal or unlawful;

• ii) Whether the policy of the Board was irrational;

• iii) Whether the Board had any discretion to permit a re-interview or further interview;

• iv) If it did, whether the policy was lawfully applied by the Board in relation to the Respondent, whether a) by unlawfully delegating that discretion to the Commissioner rather than exercising it itself, or b) by the fettering of any such discretion without itself paying regard to the individual circumstances of the respondent.

• v) Whether the policy of the Board was unfair;

CONCLUSION

8 A. ILLEGALITY

The Board had statutory powers expressly vested in it to conduct interviews for promotion. It was therefore entitled to adopt a policy to guide the exercise of its statutory jurisdiction to conduct such interviews. On the evidence, the policy did admit the possibility of exceptions. That is demonstrated by the evidence of Ms. Lewis that she recommended that the claimant/respondent be re-interviewed.

There is therefore no basis for contending that the existence of such a general policy would be illegal.

B. IRRATIONALITY

There were logical and rational reasons advanced for a general policy of not permitting re-interviews. These included:

• i) The need to ensure that no candidate was given preferential treatment;

• ii) The need not to set a precedent that would a) undermine the fairness, validity and transparency of the promotion system in the police service, and b) open the floodgates for litigation by any officer who was disappointed with his performance at the interview to demand a second interview;

• iii) The need to avoid permitting an unfair advantage to any candidate granted a second interview who would obtain more time to prepare;

• iv) Although not expressed by the Board, inherent in the floodgates argument above would be the possibility of inundating the Board with requests for considering a re-interview.

• v) The need to avoid rendering the promotion process unworkable and cumbersome as a result of delays caused by a series of re-interviews.

The existence of such reasons negates any contention of irrationality or unreasonableness. Any policy of not affording re-interviews, being rational, therefore, could not by itself be unfair. Any alleged unfairness could only therefore be based on a challenge to the application of that policy in relation to the respondent.

It must be noted that not only could the Board adopt a policy in relation to re-interviews, but it could enunciate its policy in terms which make clear that consideration as to exceptions to it would only be entertained in exceptional circumstances, and that it would first consider whether such exceptional circumstances even apply, with a strict time limit for raising these.

C. DISCRETION TO RE-INTERVIEW

The Board, having an independent statutory jurisdiction to conduct interviews, also had powers, as confirmed by the Interpretation Act, incidental and reasonably necessary to enable the exercise of those powers. This included, inter alia, the jurisdiction/power to determine whether, in the circumstances, an interview had been completed, or needed to be adjourned, or even considered afresh.

D. I. WHETHER POLICY LAWFULLY APPLIED BY THE BOARD

The powers of the Board with respect to conducting interviews for promotion were vested exclusively in it by statute. The Commissioner of Police had no role in determining the application of any policy concerning interviews by the statutorily independent Board. It was not, therefore, possible for the Board to delegate those powers to the Commissioner, an office or officer separate from itself. Those powers far less any discretion as to their exercise to the Commissioner. Such a delegation by the Board therefore amounted to an unauthorised, impermissible, and unlawful delegation or abdication of its own jurisdiction and discretion. The application of the Board's policy to the respondent on the basis of such a delegation or abdication by the Board of its own discretion to the Commissioner was therefore also without any legal basis, impermissible and unlawful.

D. II. WHETHER DISCRETION WAS FETTERED IN APPLICATION OF POLICY

The issue as to whether, alternatively, the Board fettered its discretion by not itself paying regard to the individual circumstances of the respondent is overtaken by the fact that the Board did not itself apply any policy, or consider whether any exceptions to it were justified, in relation to the respondent. It did, however, fetter its discretion by abdicating it completely to the Commissioner rather than by itself applying its policy rigidly. In the circumstances of the instant case, there is therefore no basis for quashing the policy in its entirety. It would suffice to indicate that there is nothing...