Shirley Phillip-Samuel and Allan Phillip v Inskip Alexander and Brian Smith Otherwise Brian Alexander

• Jurisdiction: Trinidad & Tobago
• Neutral Citation: TT 2025 HC 287
• Year: 2025
• Court: High Court (Trinidad and Tobago)

Shirley Phillip-Samuel and Allan Phillip

and

Inskip Alexander and Brian Smith Otherwise Brian Alexander

Mohammed, J.

Suit No.: CV2019-03233

High Court

Appearances:

Ms. Sally-Ann King-Solomon, Attorney at Law for the Claimant.

Mr. Glen Bhagwansingh, Attorney at Law for the Defendants.

Mohammed, J.

1 The Claimants are the children of Sylvia Williams (“Sylvia”). They have brought this action in order to obtain the following orders:

• (a) A declaration that Bhadase Sagan Maraj (“Mr. Sagan Maraj”) is the legal owner of All and Singular that certain piece or parcel of land situate at Tunapuna in the Ward of Tacarigua comprising Thirteen Acres Two Roods and Three Perches and bounded on the North by lands of the heirs of Joseph Numa Maingot, Maingot Road and lands of Mahabir Maharadge on the East by lands of the heirs of Joseph Numa Maingot, by lands of Sarjoosingh, by Albert Street and lands of Mahabir Maharadge and Maingot Road and on the West by lands of D. Chinibas by lands of the heirs of Joseph Numa Maingot and intersected by Maingot Road and by a Road Reserved Twenty links wide which said parcel of land was at one time described in the Assessment Roll as comprising Fourteen Acres and Seven Perches and as bounded on the North by lands of J. Maingot on the South by Maingot Road on the East by lands Thomas and on the West by lands of J. Maingot and which said piece or parcel of land is described in Deeds of Conveyance 6013/1937 and 8014/1958 and also in Deed of Assent registered as No. DE201102012150 hereinafter described as (“the larger parcel of land”).

• (b) A declaration that the rights of Mr. Sagan Maraj, his heirs or successors in title to the smaller portion of land comprising more or less 5,000 square feet (“the lot”) which forms part of the larger parcel of land have been extinguished by the Second Claimant by her undisturbed occupation of the said land for over 16 years commencing from in or about the year 1973.

• (c) The Second Claimant is entitled to the lot which her chattel house and the chattel house of the First Named Claimant stand.

• (d) The First and Second Defendants are prohibited from interfering with the lot which is occupied by the Second Claimant, and Deed of Assent No DE201102012150 (“the 2011 Deed”) should be rectified to exclude the smaller piece or portion of land.

• (e) The First Defendant do reimburse the sum of $35,000.00 paid by the Third Claimant for the sale to him of a piece of the lot.

• (f) Costs.

• (g) Such further and/or other relief that the Court may deem appropriate.

2 The Claimants asserted that since 1973, the Second Claimant (“Sylvia”) has been in occupation of the lot. Initially, Sylvia constructed a one-bedroom wooden structure, which she occupied and which had no electricity. Between 1975 and 1987, Sylvia improved her house, and in 1987, she obtained an electricity connection. In 2000, James Greene (“Mr. Greene”) approached Sylvia, claiming to be the owner of the larger parcel of land where he offered to sell the lot to Sylvia for the sum of $50,000.00. Mr. Greene did not show Sylvia any documents of ownership of the lot, but she still paid a deposit of $5,000.00 and executed an agreement for sale. In 2000, the house was assessed for the payment of building taxes, which Sylvia paid up until 2009.

3 In 2011, Sylvia gave the First Claimant permission to construct a house on the lot. Therefore, since 2011, there have been two houses on the lot, one owned by the First Claimant and the other, Sylvia's house, which is occupied by the Third Claimant with Sylvia's permission. Sometime in late 2014 or early 2015, Carmelia Smith-Russell (“Carmelia”) offered to sell the lot to the First Claimant, who agreed to purchase it on behalf of Sylvia. Sometime in 2017, the First Claimant learnt that Carmelia had also offered to sell the lot to the Third Claimant, who had already made payments in excess of $30,000.00 towards the purchase of it.

4 The First Claimant's attorney at law requested that Carmelia provide a copy of her Deed showing proof of ownership of the larger parcel of land. Carmelia provided it, and the Claimant's Attorney at law caused a search on title to be prepared. The results of the title search showed that the larger parcel of land was owned by Mr. Sagan Maraj. There is no Deed transferring the larger parcel of land to Augustus Alexander (“Augustus”), who in his Will gave it to Rita Smith (“Rita”). In a Deed of Assent No 9296 of 1998 (“the 1998 Deed”), the larger parcel of land was conveyed to Rita, and by the 2011 Deed, it was transferred to Carmelia and eight other siblings. The Claimant's Attorney at law wrote to the Defendant's Attorney at law, pointing out the defects in title, but there was no response.

5 The Defendants opposed the orders sought by the Claimants. Their case was that Rita inherited the larger parcel from Augustus, and upon her demise, she passed it to them and Carmelia and her siblings. They did not dispute that Sylvia has been living on the lot since 1973. Their position was that Sylvia was a tenant as she recognised Rita as the owner of the lot and paid annual land rent. They also contended that Sylvia became a statutory tenant pursuant to the Land Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act.

THE WITNESSES

6 The First and Third Claimants gave evidence at the trial to support their case, and the witnesses for the Defendants were Inskip Alexander (“Inskip”) and Brian Smith (“Brian”).

THE ISSUES

7 The issues which arose for determination are:

• (a) Whether the Claimants can obtain the declarations against Mr. Sagan Maraj.

• (b) Whether Sylvia is entitled to possession of the lot.

• (c) Whether the 2011 Deed of Assent should be rectified to exclude the lot.

• (d) Whether the First Defendant shall reimburse the sum of $35,000.00 to the Third Claimant for the sale of the lot to him, which he paid Carmelia.

WHETHER THE CLAIMANT CAN OBTAIN THE DECLARATIONS SOUGHT AGAINST MR SAGAN MARAJ

8 The Claimant's case and evidence were that the report on title showed that Mr. Sagan Maraj was the paper title owner of the larger parcel of land and that there was no document which showed how Augustus became the owner. The nature of the declarations sought against Mr. Sagan Maraj is to recognise his ownership of the larger parcel of land and to extinguish his title to the lot. In my opinion, the Claimants cannot obtain the declarations against Mr. Sagan Maraj as neither he nor his legal personal representatives were parties to the action. This was important as he/they were not given the opportunity to put forward their case with respect to extinguishing the title to the lot.

WHETHER SYLVIA IS ENTITLED TO POSSESSION OF THE LOT

9 The Claimants grounded their claim on the legal doctrine of adverse possession. The principles of law on adverse possession are settled. Section 3 of the Real Property Limitation Act (“the RPLA”) states that “No person shall make an entry or distress, or bring an action to recover any land or rent, but within 16 years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such an action, shall have first accrued to some person….

10 Section 22 of the RPLA provides that “At the determination of the period limited by this Act to any person for making an entry or distress, or bringing any action or suit, the right and title of such person to the land or rent for the recovery whereof such entry, distress, action or suit respectively might have been made or brought within such period shall be extinguished.”

11 The right of the First Defendant, as legal owner to recover possession of the property is barred whenever 16 years have elapsed from the time when any right of action has accrued. Lord Browne-Wilkinson in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and another v. Graham and another [2002] 3 All E.R. 865 stated at paragraphs 26 to 27 that:

“It is to be noted that the right of action to recover the land is barred whenever 12 years have elapsed from the time when any right of action accrued; it does not have to be a period immediately before action brought. In the case of unregistered land, on the expiration of the limitation period regulating recovery of the land, the title of the paper owner is extinguished….

The action was brought by Pye at the earliest on 30 April 1998. The question, therefore, is whether, prior to that date, there...