Seenath Jairam SC v Renee Peterson

• Jurisdiction: Trinidad & Tobago
• Court: High Court (Trinidad and Tobago)
• Judge: Mr. Justice Kevin Ramcharan
• Judgment Date: 30 January 2023
• Neutral Citation: TT 2023 HC 26
• Docket Number: CLAIM NO. CV2022-04023

Between

Seenath Jairam SC

Applicant

and

Renee Peterson

Curtis Peterson

(In their capacity as the joint administrators of the Estate of Rudolph Peterson who died on the 3rd day of April, 2012)

Respondents

Before

the Honourable Mr. Justice Kevin Ramcharan

CLAIM NO. CV2022-04023

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

(PORT OF SPAIN)

Appearances:

Ms. Joan Byrne, Mr. Jerome Rajcoomar instructed by Mr. Carlon McLeod, Attorneys at Law for the Applicant

Mr. Dereck Balliram instructed by Ms. Ilisha Manerikar, Attorneys at Law for the First Respondent

Ms. Angelique Olowe instructed by Ms. Deborah Thomas, Attorneys at Law for the Second Respondent

DECISION ON APPLICATIONS TO STRIKE OUT

1 The Applicant is a Senior Counsel who provided legal services for one Rudolph Peterson, Deceased. The Respondents are two (2) of the deceased's children and by virtue of the order Kokaram, J (as he then was) dated the 23 ^rd day of September, 2013, in CV2013-02053 and CV2013-03228 were granted Letters of Administration in the Estate of the Deceased.

2 The Applicant alleges that fees are due and owing to him arising out of the legal services which he provided the Deceased. He has sought to commence the procedure for making a claim for the payment of the fees by assessing his costs, which is a condition precedent under Section 51 of the provisions of the Legal Profession Act. He has done so by filing this claim for permission to assess the costs on an Attorney/Client basis.

3 The Respondents by applications filed on the 14 ^th day of December, 2022 and on the 15 ^th day of December, 2022, respectively, have both sought to strike out this application on varying grounds, although they have, where appropriate, adopted each other's grounds. The First Respondent claims that the action is statute barred under the provisions of the Limitation of Certain Actions Act, Chapter 7:09. The Second Respondent, in addition to the limitation claim, claims that the action cannot be brought against them as no grant of Letters of Administration was ever issued to them. Further, he submits that as administrator, he ought only to be liable for acts which were done by him and that any agreement was between the First Respondent and the Applicant alone.

4 With respect to the limitation point, the Court agrees with the Applicant that this application is made prematurely. This is not an action to enforce the agreement between the Applicant and the Deceased. This is an application to assess the reasonable costs of the services provided by the Applicant. If it were the case that the only possible use for the assessment of costs was to commence an action against the Respondents for the payment of fees, then the position may have been different. However, the assessment of costs will establish the value of the work done by the Applicant. Further, once the costs are assessed, the Applicant will then have to issue separate proceedings to enforce the agreement. It is at this stage that any defence with respect to the limitation period can be raised. It is to be noted that all the cases relied upon by the First Respondent dealt with this phase, that is to say, the phase of enforcement. We are not yet at this phase. It would there also, be inappropriate to deal with the limitation point in detail at this time.

5 In the circumstances, the applications to strike out on the basis of the expiration of the limitation period must fail.

6 With respect to the other aspects of the Second Respondent's application, it would be convenient to deal with the second aspect first, as this is, in the Court's view completely without merit. The Application before the Court is not to hold the Second Respondent liable for anything that the First Respondent did, but rather, to assess the value of the work done by the Applicant on behalf of the Deceased. As the Respondents were appointed jointly, assuming that they can be sued without having been issued the grant, they are jointly appointed on behalf of the Estate and their individual acts bind the Estate and they can be sued jointly on behalf of the Estate. As Lord Burrows stated in Mohan Jogie v Angela Sealy 1: “First, he submitted that relation back was inapplicable because Angela Sealy has not joined with her co-administrator, Osden Abbott, in confirming the renewal of the lease. In my view, this is not a valid objection because the general rule (with the exception of conveyances of real property and share and stock transfers) is that the act of one joint administrator is treated as the act of all of them and is binding on them: Williams, Mortimer and Sunnocks, para 50–69, approved by Newey J in Birdseye v Roythorne & Co [2015] EWHC 1003 (Ch), paras 30–33.”

7 In the circumstances, the second part of the Second Respondent's application must fail.

8 The first part of the application requires more attention. The submission of the Second Respondent is that despite the order of Kokaram, J (as he then was) on the 23 ^rd day of September, 2013, the grant of Letters of Administration were never issued by the

Registrar and therefore, the Respondents have no authority to act on behalf of the Estate and by extension, they have no authority to be sued on behalf of the Estate

9 Reliance is placed on Section 40 of the Wills and Probate Act, Chapter 9:03 which states as follows: “No probate or administration shall be granted by the Court until the applicant has filed with the Registrar the certificate mentioned in subsection (3) of Section 35 of the Estate and Succession Duties Act or has filed the certificate mention in subsection (2) or subsection (4) of that Act.”

10 Further, reliance was placed on the decision of Mohammed (R), J in Dan Cordell McKnight v The Registrar of the Supreme Court & Anor 2. In that case, an order had been made (a) discharging one of the Personal Representatives of the Estate of the Deceased, revoking the grant of Letters of Administration and (b) ordering that “The First Defendant be replaced by Dan Cordell McKnight as one of the personal representatives of the Estate of the Deceased, for the use and benefit of the Claimant, limited until the Claimant 3 shall come in and apply and obtain Letters of Administration of the said Estate.”

11 The Registrar had declined to issue the grant of Letters of Administration until an application had been made. The Applicant sought judicial review of the decision and further sued the Second Respondent who was the other personal representative who had not been removed, claiming that she was not acting in the best interest of the Estate.

12 The Court held that the Registrar had acted correctly in not issuing the grant. He stated that the Court not having set out the procedure, the Registrar was correct in insisting that an application in accordance with Rule 4 of the Non-Contentious Business Rules be filed 4.

13 He further, held that as the grant had not been issued, the Second Respondent could not have been said to have empowered to act on behalf of the Estate and therefore, could not be said to have been not acting in the best interest of...