Samlalsingh v Deverteuil
| Jurisdiction | Trinidad & Tobago |
| Judge | Roopnarine J. |
| Judgment Date | 26 July 1976 |
| Neutral Citation | TT 1976 HC 37 |
| Docket Number | No. 1634 of 1976 |
| Court | High Court (Trinidad and Tobago) |
| Date | 26 July 1976 |
High Court
Roopnarine, J.
No. 1634 of 1976
E. Thorne Q. C. and J. Davis for plaintiff
E. Hamel-Wells Q.C. and R. Martineau for defendant
Injunction - Interim injunction to restrain defendants from interfering with the right of the plaintiff to enter horses in horse racing event — Principles governing grant.
On 25th June 1976 the plaintiff filed his writ against the defendants.
He claimed:
- An injunction restraining the defendants and each of them whether by themselves or himself or their or his servant from interfering or attempting to interfere with the rights of the plaintiff to enter into or continue such contractual relation with the Union Park Turf Club (U.P.T.C.), the Arima Race Club (A.R.C.) and Tobago Race Club (T.R.C.) as he wishes and generally interfering or attempting to interfere with the right of the plaintiff to enter race horses and race such horses at race meetings organised by the said Clubs and every of them. 2. A declaration that he is entitled to enter and race, racehorses at all meetings organised by the defendant Club. 3. A declaration that he is entitled to race a horse known as “‘Noble Mark” at the Summer Meeting 1976 a race meeting organised by the defendant Club. 4. An order restraining the defendant and every of them by themselves their servants or howsoever otherwise from directing the said U.P.T.G., A.R.C. and T.R.C. not to accept entries made by the plaintiff for meetings organised by the said Clubs and or doing one act in relation to the said Clubs whereby the said Clubs might be induced to exclude such entries for their said meetings, 5. Damages for procuring or inducing the said U.P.T.C. to commit a breach of a contract made between it and the plaintiff. 6. Damages for unlawfully interfering with the contractual relations between the plaintiff and the said U.P.T.C. 7. Damages for intimidation. 8. A declaration that the purported decision of the T.T.G. or the defendant Club refusing him permission to race the said horse “‘Rare Find” or any horse owned by him is ultra vires the defendant Club, null void and of no effect. 9. An order restraining the defendants and every of them from acting or purporting to act from taking any step in pursuance of the staid purported decision. 10. Costs. 11. Further or other relief.
On 28 th June 1976 the plaintiff pursuant to 0.2 – R. 1 amended the writ to give the addresses of the individual defendants and to include the following paragraph before paragraph 1 of the writ as originally endorsed — “The plaintiff's Claim against the defendants (who are herein sued on their own behalf and behalf of all other members of the Trinidad Turf Club) is for:
On the same date as the original writ was filed, the plaintiff on affidavit sought an interim injunction by an ex parte application praying for leave to serve upon the defendants the interim order of injunction and a summons to continue the injunction was also filed returnable for Friday 2 nd July 1976. Upon that summons the interlocutory injunction was granted to the plaintiff on the 25 th June 1976 by a Judge in Chambers. The order is to the effect that the defendants, their servants or agents and every one of them be restrained from refusing to accept the entry by the plaintiff for the race meeting of the defendant Trinidad Turf Club commencing on 26 th June 1976 for the participation thereat by the plaintiff's racehorse “Noble Mark” or by such other horses as the plaintiff might wish to enter for participation or from refusing to permit the said horse or horses to participate at the said meeting on every day on which the same might be held. Further that the defendants, their servants or agents and every of them be restrained from purporting to direct the U.P.T.C., A.R.C, and the T.R.C. and each of them to refuse to permit any racehorses owned by him to participate at race meetings organised by them or any of them until the hearing of the said summons.
The facts giving rise to this action are substantially not in dispute and are fully set out in the affidavits of the plaintiff and one of the defendants Mr. Anthony Hamel-Smith and in so far as they are in conflict one with the other does not affect this application.
The defendants entered an appearance on the 1 st July 1976 but previous to this on 30 th June 1976 an affidavit sworn to by Anthony Hamel-Smith, a Solicitor, a Steward of the Trinidad Turf Club, a member of the Management Committee of the said Club and the 4 th named defendant on behalf of all the defendants on the 30 th June 1976 one day prior to the entry of appearance. Counsel for the plaintiff took the preliminary point that the affidavit having been filed prior to the entry of appearance could not be used at the hearing of the summons, after reply by Counsel for the defendants I overruled the submission and the hearing proceeded.
I therefore proceed to consider the object of an interlocutory order and the principles upon which an interlocutory order of injunction is granted by the Court. In Halsbury's Laws 3 rd ed. Vol. 21 pg. 343 para. 716 it is stated. “The object of an interlocutory injunction is to preserve matters in status quo until the case can be tried and the party applying for an interlocutory injunction must always give an undertaking in damages, in case it should turn out at the hearing that he is in the wrong. Such an injunction is therefore usually so framed as to continue in force only until the hearing of the cause, or until further order. It cannot be considered in argument as affecting the ultimate decision of a cause.
It does not assume finally to dispose of the right, and will only impose such restraint as may suffice to stop the mischief complained of, or where the object is to stay further injury, to keep things as they are”.
In American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. [1975] 1 All E.R., 504 at pg. 509 a — d Lord Diplock in the course of his judgment in which the other law lords sitting with him in the matter concurred stated as follows:
“My Lords, when an application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain a defendant from doing acts alleged to be in violation of the plaintiff's legal right is made on contested facts, the decision whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction has to be taken at a time when ex hypothesi the existence of the right or the violation of it, or both, is uncertain and will remain uncertain until final judgment is given in the action. It was to mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff during the period before that uncertainty could be resolved that the practice arose of granting him relief by way of interlocutory injunction; but since the middle of the 19 th century this has been made subject to his undertaking to pay damages to the defendant for any loss sustained by reason of the injunction if it should be held at the trial that the plaintiff has not been entitled to restrain the defendant from doing what he was threatening to do. The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial; but the plaintiff's need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated under the plaintiff's undertaking in damages if the uncertainty were resolved in the defendant's favour at the trial. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where ‘the balance of convenience’ lies.”
Ibid p. 510 c — e “Your Lordships should in my...
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