Ramharack v Caroni 1975 Ltd et Al

• Jurisdiction: Trinidad & Tobago
• Judge: Mendes, J.
• Judgment Date: 29 May 1998
• Neutral Citation: TT 1998 HC 69
• Docket Number: No. S 723 of 1996
• Court: High Court (Trinidad and Tobago)
• Date: 29 May 1998

High Court

Mendes, J.

No. S 723 of 1996

Ramharack

and

Caroni 1975 Limited et al

Appearances:

Mr. Gregory Armorer for the plaintiff

Mr. Bobby Bahadoorsingh for the defendant

Negligence - Liability — Plaintiff claimed damages for personal injuries and consequential loss incurred and suffered when she was struck down by a vehicle belonging to first defendant and driven by second defendant — Court held that driver did not keep a proper look out and drove too fast — Defendant 70% to blame — Damages to be assessed by a matter.

Mendes, J.

1 The Plaintiff claims damages for injuries and consequential loss incurred and suffered when she was struck by a vehicle belonging to the first Defendant and driven by the second Defendant. The accident occurred at the intersection of the San Fernando by-pass and Rushworth Street. The San Fernando by-pass runs from north to south. Rushworth Street runs from east to west and begins at its intersection with the by-pass. The northbound carriageway of the by-pass consists of two lanes, together measuring approximately thirty-three feet. On approaching the intersection from the north, the south-bound carriageway consists initially of two lanes but branches out into three lanes just before the intersection. Beyond the intersection going further south, the south-bound reconverts into two lanes. The third lane on the south-bound carriageway is for vehicles turning right into Rushworth Street and is therefore located on the innermost right of the carriageway or to the west of the other two lanes. There is a concrete median about eighteen inches high separating the north from the south-bound carriageway. Naturally, at the intersection, the continuity of the C median is interrupted to permit south-bound traffic to enter Rushworth Street.

2 The intersection is controlled by traffic lights. The lights controlling traffic going north are located on the western side of the by-pass just north of Rushworth Street and overhang the north-bound carriageway from an L-shaped pole. There are two sets of lights controlling the south bound traffic. Just in the middle of Rushworth Street on the eastern side of the by-pass is a set lights overhanging the south-bound carriageway in similar fashion to the lights controlling the north-bound traffic. This set of lights controls the traffic going south past the intersection. The lights which control the traffic turning right into Rushworth Street are located on the southern side of the intersection on a pole imbedded in they concrete median. On approaching the intersection from the north, it is not possible to see the lights facing the north-bound traffic. Similarly, on approaching the intersection from the south, the traffic lights facing vehicles turning into Rushworth Street are not in view.

3 There are white lines across both the north and south-bound carriageways at the intersection. The Plaintiff was struck by the first Defendant's vehicle as she was attempting to cross the north-bound carriageway on her way to Rushworth Street. The point of impact was in the right lane just north of the traffic lights overhanging the carriageway at a distance of between 132 and 141 feet from the white line on the north bound carriageway. The Plaintiff claims that the light for traffic going into Rushworth Street was green in her favour and that the second Defendant entered the intersection against a red light. The second Defendant contends for the exact opposite. The first issue to be resolved, therefore, is one entirely of fact and it concerns the colour of the traffic lights at the most material moment.

4 On July 5 ^th 1995 at around 7.00 p.m., the Plaintiff was seated at the rear of a vehicle travelling south on the by-pass approaching the intersection. She says that upon her quest, the driver of the vehicle pulled over into the lane nearest to the concrete median and stopped just before the intersection. Her intention was to cross over the north-bound carriageway to proceed into Rushworth Street. As she got out of the car and stood on the concrete median, she noticed that the light controlling traffic turning into Rushworth Street was green, indicating to her that the light controlling the north-bound traffic was red. In fact, the Plaintiff says that she noticed that the left lane of the north-bound carriageway was at that moment occupied by two vehicles which were in a stationary position and that there were no vehicles in the right lane. Thinking it safe, she proceeded to cross but by the time she got to the middle of the carriageway she became aware of a white pick-up rushing towards her at a terrific speed. No doubt in panic, she attempted to hurry back to the concrete median to safety but was struck in the right lane before she could do so. The plaintiff says that when she saw the white pick-up, she recalls than the vehicles on the left lane of the north-bound carriageway were still at a standstill at the white line. I am asked to infer from this that the second Defendant ran the red light and that he is accordingly solely to blame for the Plaintiff's injuries.

5 It emerged in cross examination that on July 24 ^th 1995, some nineteen (19) days after the accident, the Plaintiff was interviewed by a police officer while she was still warded at the San Fernando General Hospital. The officer reduced what the Plaintiff said into writing; and read over his recorded statement to her. The Plaintiff signed the statement which, so as is material, is in the following terms:

On Wednesday 5 ^th July 1995 around 6:15 p.m. I boarded a 280C taxi on Independence Square, Port of Spain, this was driven by a Negro man. I don't know the number of this vehicle. I was seated in the rear seat behind the driver. Shortly after the taxi left for San Fernando. On reaching near the Rushworth Street tragic lights I spoke to the driver. As a result he pulled to the extreme right of the south-bound lane where I got off on the right side. I stood upon the concrete island which is in the centre of the road way. I spoke to the driver of the taxi and he said it was safe to cross. As a result I started crossing from east to west. Whilst doing so I observed a white pick-up with yellow writing suddenly proceeding north along the said road. I hurriedly tried to go back on the concrete island when the said vehicle pulled and collided with me.

6 Counsel for the Defendants drew attention to the following contradictions between the Plaintiff's evidence and her written statement.

• a. In her statement, the Plaintiff said that she was travelling in a 280C taxi. She insisted in her oral evidence, however, that she was travelling in a pick-up. It further transpired that in the Magistrate's Court in related proceedings she told the presiding Magistrate that she was travelling in a 280C taxi. When asked by Counsel whether she had made a mistake, the Plaintiff insisted that no mistake had been made but that she had told a deliberate lie to the Magistrate. Whether the Plaintiff was travelling in a pick-up or a 280C taxi appears wholly irrelevant to any of the issues which arise in this case. It was therefore quite puzzling that on such an insignificant matter the Plaintiff thought it necessary first to lie to the Magistrate and then to confess her perjury before me. What motivated the Plaintiff to purge her conscience at this particular point in time is left to speculation, but this obvious blemish on her credibility and trustworthiness could not have been expected to do her case any good.

• b. In the statement, the Plaintiff said that she alighted from the vehicle, stood on the concrete island and at that point the driver told her that it was safe to cross. She then proceeded to cross. In cross examination, however, the Plaintiff says that the driver told her that it was safe to cross just as she was opening the door and coming out of the vehicle. She then stood on the concrete median, looked to the south, observed that the light for traffic going into Rushworth Street was green and then proceeded to cross.

• c. While the Plaintiff maintained that she told the police officer that the light controlling traffic turning into Rushworth Street was green, this crucial fact was not recorded is her statement.

• d. In cross examination, the Plaintiff said that the first Defendant's vehicle did not have its lights on. However, she said that she did not give this important bit of information to the police officer and that this explains its omission from her statement.

• e. In her statement, the Plaintiff is recorded to have said that she left Port of Spain at around 6:15 p.m. on her way to San Fernando. In oral evidence, however, she said that she commenced her journey at 5.00 p.m.

7 Quite apart from her own admission of perjury, the Plaintiff's credibility was adversely affected by the significant omission from her statement of crucial information concerning the colour of the lights and the inference which flowed therefrom concerning who might have had the right of way. To similar effect is her failure to tell the police officer that the headlights of the second Defendant's vehicle were not on at that hour of the night. One would have expected that such important information would have been related and, if related, faithfully recorded. One the other hand, one might have been prepared to downplay the other less important contradictions. However, when asked to explain the divergence between what she claims she told the police officer and what the police officer actually recorded, she was not satisfied with the quite plausible explanation that there is a big difference between signing something which you have read and studied for yourself and signing a statement which has been read over to you; she then proceeded to gild the lily, as it were, by suggesting that when reading over the statement to her, the police officer may have deliberately read things...