R v Peters

• Jurisdiction: Trinidad & Tobago
• Court: Court of Appeal (Trinidad and Tobago)
• Judge: Hyatali, C.J.,Corbin, J.A.,Rees, J.A.
• Judgment Date: 18 May 1976
• Neutral Citation: TT 1976 CA 31
• Docket Number: Criminal Appeal No. 29 of 1975
• Date: 18 May 1976

Court of Appeal

Hyatali, C.J.; Corbin, J.A.; Rees, J.A.

Criminal Appeal No. 29 of 1975

Regina

and

Peters

Criminal Law - Carnal knowledge — Misdirections by judge on evidence including distressed condition of the prosecutrix when she went home.

Criminal Law - Carnal knowledge — Corroboration

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:

1 The appellant was convicted at the Port-of-Spain Assizes on 10th June, 1975, for having carnal knowledge of Debra Joseph without consent, on 10th October, 1974. Put in a nutshell, the case for the prosecution was that the appellant, who was working on a Government project in Port-of-Spain, the prosecutrix in this case, took her to a house, and there had intercourse with her without her consent. The appellant's case was that he did have intercourse with the prosecutrix but with her consent, and, in fact, that was not the only occasion on which he had intercourse with her; he had been having intercourse regularly with her for a period of six months prior to the time of the incident.

2 In summing up the case to the jury, the learned trial judge in on otherwise impeccable summing up unfortunately omitted to direct the jury on essential matters relating to corroboration. It was a case in which there was no corroboration whatever and it was the judge's duty, not only to point out to the jury that there was no corroboration, but to point out that the evidence of the complaint which the prosecutrix made was to be regarded not as evidence of the truth of what she was stating, but merely as evidence of the consistency of her conduct.

3 Counsel for the appellant has criticised the sufficiency of the judge's directions as to the meaning of corroboration but we do not agree with him. When the judged directions are read as a whole it is quite plain that in effect she not only correctly told the jury what corroboration was but indicated what type of evidence was required to support the requirements of the low with respect to corroboration. Where the learned trial judge went wrong, in our view, was in omitting to tell the jury that the complaint which the girl made was evidence of consistency of her conduct and was not to be regarded as corroboration. The law is very clear on that.

4 But there was another error which the judge made. There was evidence in the case that certain noises were coming from the place the intercourse was taking place. In addition to that there was evidence of the appellant to...