Oralyn Nanton-Weekes v Margaret Nanton

• Jurisdiction: Trinidad & Tobago
• Judge: Devindra Rampersad
• Judgment Date: 06 September 2024
• Neutral Citation: TT 2024 HC 195
• Docket Number: Claim No.: CV2018-02342
• Court: High Court (Trinidad and Tobago)

Between

Oralyn Nanton-Weekes

First Claimant

Glenna Nanton

Second Claimant

and

Margaret Nanton

Defendant

Before The Honourable Mr. Justice Devindra Rampersad

Claim No.: CV2018-02342

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

Appearances:

Claimants: Semone Cudjoe-Peters

Defendant: Veena Badrie-Maharaj instructed by Bina Maharaj

Contents

Introduction	3
Discussion	4
The Reimbursement of the First Claimant	4
The Alleged Undue Influence	6
The Alleged Equity	8
The Evidence	10
Conclusion and Order	15
The Order	17

Introduction

1 By virtue of Deed of Gift registered and dated 09 August 2017 as DE201801839526, the claimants became joint owners, together with the late Ira Davis (“the deceased”) of the premises at No. 6 Sixth Street, Barataria (“the subject premises”).

2 The parties are sisters and the claimants are joint legal owners of the subject premises, although they both reside elsewhere. The defendant has resided at the subject premises for most of her life.

3 The deceased was the parties' mother and the claimants allege that, prior to her passing, the deceased permitted the defendant to reside at the subject premises rent free without the promise or award of proprietary rights in any form.

4 Following many disputes and displays of hostility after the passing of the deceased, the defendant refused to vacate the subject premises as she claimed to have a life interest in the subject premises and an equitable interest in same.

5 By fixed date claim form and statement of case filed on 2 July 2018, the claimants sought the following reliefs from the defendant:

• 5.1. An order for vacant possession of all and singular that certain piece or parcel of land together with the dwelling house standing thereon situate and known as No. 6 Sixth Street, Barataria in the ward of St. Anns in the island of Trinidad;

• 5.2. An injunction restraining the defendant, whether by herself or her servants and or agents from entering upon and or remaining and or occupying the said property in any way whatsoever;

• 5.3. Mesne profits at the rate of $1,500 a month until possession is delivered up;

• 5.4. An order for costs of this action;

• 5.5. Such further or other reliefs as the Court may deem fit.

6 The defendant's case is that the deceased operated under undue influence when the aforementioned Deed of Gift was prepared and registered and therefore the said Deed ought to be set aside from the records of the Registrar General's Department.

7 It was alleged that the deceased, at the time of the execution of the said Deed, was unable to see, read, understand and sign documents and as such, she was not in a position to complete such a transaction.

8 Further, that by virtue of improvements done to the subject premises by herself and/or by her direction, together with her primary care of the parties' mother prior to her death, she acquired an equitable interest in the premises.

9 Additionally, the defendant by counterclaim filed on 13 September 2018, claimed that she acquired a life interest in the subject premises as the deceased mentioned to the defendant on occasions that she “had life in the property”. Therefore, the reliefs that were sought by the defendant are:

• 9.1. An order that the Deed of Gift registered as DE201701839526D001 and dated 4 July 2017 be set aside from the records held by the Registrar General's Department on the basis that it was executed by the deceased under due influence;

• 9.2. In the alternative, an order that the defendant is entitled to an equitable interest in the said property situate at No. 6 Sixth Street, Barataria and that she be entitled to a life interest in the said property;

• 9.3. Costs;

• 9.4. Such further and or other relief that this Honourable Court may deem appropriate.

10 At the trial, there were four witnesses present on behalf of the claimant and four for the defendant.

11 The court has read the pleadings, witness statements and all relevant documents and has read the submissions and seen and heard the witnesses give their evidence.

Discussion

The Reimbursement of the First Claimant

12 The court accepts the evidence given by the defendant that the first claimant paid for the loan by way of salary deductions that was taken from the National Housing Authority around January 1976 to finance the rebuilding of the family home from wood to concrete as she was employed as a nurse at the time and could qualify for the same as opposed to her parents, who could not. The court accepts as well that she continued to pay for the same through her salary. The evidence she provided from the Accounts Department of the St. Ann's Hospital of December 1996 was the deduction of the total sum of $60,113.12 from 1976 to 1996 from her salary toward the National Housing Authority.

13 It is important to note that the common ground on the pleadings on both sides was that the agreement with the National Housing Authority was between the first claimant and her parents, of the one part and the National Housing Authority of the other. According to the statement of case, this loan was to assist with the acquisition and construction of the dwelling house upon the subject premises.

14 There is no evidence of the first claimant's parents reimbursing her for the deductions. However, there seems to have been a common intention that the first claimant was the vehicle through which the loan was obtained by means of her employment at the time. Clearly, the inclusion of the parents with the first claimant indicated an intention for them to have an interest – a position that was clearly accepted by all of the children including the first claimant having regard to the manner in which the deceased made her will in 2002 and then the subsequent deed of gift in 2017 after the death of the deceased's husband, Lawrence Davis. A copy of the agreement with National Housing Authority was not provided.

15 With respect to the allegation that their mother, the deceased, received the money from the estate of Kenrick who died on 15 May 1987 in the sum of $250,000 which she used to pay off the first claimant for the mortgage payments, the court finds that there was no cogent evidence in that regard especially since deductions continued until 1996 at least as stated before. The allegations that the deceased told the first defendant that she received that money and that she paid off the first claimant was not supported by any contemporaneous document which was clearly available. Kenrick died in 1987 and there must have been records with the insurance company and the place where he worked to have shown that any monies that his estate was entitled to was paid to the deceased. No grant of representation – whether grant of probate or letters of administration – was produced in relation to Kenrick's estate in favour of the deceased nor was any inventory of the estate of Kenrick put before the court. The court therefore does not put any weight to the mere oral allegation about this when there was obviously better evidence that could have been produced through the estate records, the insurance company records and the death benefit/gratuity records from Kenrick's place of employment. With respect to the last aspect of the previous sentence, there was no evidence as to where Kenrick even worked to suggest that any entitlement to death benefits/gratuity arose at all.

16 The court therefore rejects the allegation and accepts the evidence from the first claimant and the defendant that the first claimant paid the National Housing Authority loan from deductions from her salary. Clearly, this gave her some sort of equitable interest in the property which later manifested into a registered interest by reason of the deed of gift. It is noteworthy, though, that the deed of gift did not acknowledge that payment and no reason was recited for the addition of the second claimant apart from natural love and affection. Further, it has to be noted that the first claimant relied upon the deed of gift for her title rather than relying upon any equitable interest by way of resulting trust or otherwise based on her said contribution by deductions from her salary. No declaration was sought in that regard in any event.

The Alleged Undue Influence

17 With respect to the deed of gift, the burden was on the defendant to show that when the Deed dated 4 July 2017 was procured, the deceased was very ill, losing her vision, and was not in a state of mind to see, read, understand and sign legal documents 1. She died in January 2018. Was she in a position to physically and mentally execute the Deed? 2 The plea on the counterclaim was of undue influence.

18 The court recently discussed the legal principles and authorities in respect of the plea of undue influence in Bhagwandeen v Bhagwandeen & Or 3 and does not feel it necessary to rehearse the same again. The court relies on the said judgment in support of its understanding of the legal principles. This court came to the considered position in that decision that:

“ 51. The court has no doubts, therefore, that the essence of the plea of undue influence is the conscience of the court and the unconscionability of a particular transaction having regard to the relationship between the parties involved and any finding of abuse of that relationship so as to give the influencer an unfair advantage over the influenced.”

19 There was no cogent evidence in relation to this burden of proof. Having regard to the fact that the deed of gift was purportedly executed before an attorney-at-law, neither the attorney-at-law nor the witness to the execution of the deed were summoned as witnesses. Further, there was absolutely no medical evidence before the court in relation to the deceased's physical and mental health conditions as at the time when the deed was executed in July 2017. The evidence of the defendant was credible but lacked...