Motor and General Insurance Company Ltd v Sanguinette et Al

• Jurisdiction: Trinidad & Tobago
• Court: Court of Appeal (Trinidad and Tobago)
• Judge: Hamel-Smith, C.J.
• Judgment Date: 20 December 2006
• Neutral Citation: TT 2006 CA 38
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No. 158 of 2003
• Date: 20 December 2006

Court of Appeal

Hamel-Smith, C.J. (Ag.); Archie, J.A.; Weekes, J.A.

Civil Appeal No. 158 of 2003

Motor and General Insurance Company Limited

and

Sanguinette et al

Appearances:

Mrs. L. Maharaj for the appellant.

Mr. S. Marcus, S.C. for the respondents.

Civil practice and procedure - Appeal — Judgment of Court of Appeal — Whether the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeal was a final decision entitling the appellants to appeal as of right to the Privy Council — No genuinely disputable issue to got to the Privy Council — Motion refused.

1 Hamel-Smith, C.J. (AG.): The main questions raised in the motion is whether the judgment rendered in this matter by the Court of Appeal is a final decision which entitles the appellants to appeal as of right to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council pursuant to section 109(1)(a) of the Constitution or whether it is an interlocutory one against which there is no appeal save with the leave of the Court of Appeal or by the grant of special leave of the Judicial Committee. A subsidiary question, in the event that the decision might be considered a final one, is whether the appeal involves a genuinely disputable issue to go to the Judicial Committee.

2 By section 109(1) of the Constitution an appeal shall lie from decisions of the Court of Appeal to the Judicial Committee as of right in the following cases:

• (a) final decisions in civil proceedings where the matter in dispute on the appeal to the Judicial Committee is of the value of fifteen hundred dollars or upwards or where the appeal involves directly or indirectly a claim to or question respecting property or a right of the value of fifteen hundred dollars or upwards;

  • (2) An appeal shall lie from decisions of the Court of Appeal to the Judicial Committee with the leave of the Court of Appeal in the following cases:-

    • (a) decisions in any civil proceedings; where in the opinion of the Court of Appeal the question involved in the appeal is one that, by reason of its great general or public importance or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Judicial Committee; and

    • (b) ……

    • (c) ……

3 The claim for leave pursuant to section 109(2)(a) can be disposed of immediately because it cannot be successfully argued that it is applicable in these circumstances. There is nothing to suggest that the issue at hand is a matter of public importance within the meaning of the section. The novelty of the legislation by itself under which the action was brought does not automatically make the issues that have arisen a matter of great public importance. There needs to be something in the provisions of the Act which gives it that quality and an ordinary application for interim costs, without more, certainly does not fit the bill.

4 Subject to the resolution of the subsidiary question, the outcome of the motion may turn on whether the application falls within section 109(1)(a). Generally, if the judgment of the Court of Appeal is considered a final decision and the claim is for a sum in excess of $ 00.00 (or if it is property the value is in excess of that amount) then leave to appeal is granted as of right. Otherwise, unless there is an issue of public importance to be determined, leave will generally be refused.

5 It is necessary to review the history of the matter in order to put the issue in its proper perspective. The respondents instituted an action against the appellant under section 242 of the Companies Act, 1995. They were the children of John Scott Sanowar, deceased. He was the majority shareholder in the appellant company. He died in 1962. Shortly after his death, his son announced that the deceased had left a will in which he had been appointed executor, but he neither produced the will nor sought probate of it to this date. In fact, no will has been produced and there is doubt that one does exist. Nonetheless, he purported to hold the shares of his father as executor of his estate and dealt with them accordingly.

6 The affairs of the company were carried on by the son over the next forty years until, on August 24, 2001, the respondents, as lawful next of kin and persons entitled to share on an intestacy, were granted letters of administration of their father's estate. On the grant of those letters they claimed that the shares of their deceased father immediately vested in them as legal personal representatives. This is not in dispute.

7 While the action against the appellant was pending the parties agreed to proceed as if the action had been commenced by writ. Directions were given for the delivery of pleadings. The appellant challenged the claim on several grounds. While it acknowledged the respondents as the legal personal representatives of the deceased shareholder, it contended that they did not qualify as ‘complainants’ within the meaning contained in section 239 of the Act. It also contended that several of the alleged acts of oppression were barred by the Limitation Act, 1997 and, in any event, the respondents were debarred from pursuing them as a result of laches.

8 Before the commencement of the trial, however, the respondents made an application for interim costs pursuant to section 244 of the Act. The appellant opposed the application on several grounds, some of which were raised in their substantive defence, viz., their status as complainants, the expiry of the limitation period and the issue of laches.

9 The appellant argued that the respondents had brought the action in their own right so they could not be considered ‘complainants’. The judge rejected this argument and it was not pursued on appeal. The judge further considered that by virtue of section 107(1)(b) of the Companies Act and the grant of letters of administration, the shares of the deceased father automatically vested in the respondents as legal personal representative of the deceased. He reasoned that since the appellant had admitted that the respondents were legal personal representatives by virtue of the grant, there could be no argument that they were not ‘shareholders’ and, as such, valid complainants under the Act.

10 As regards limitation and laches, counsel for the appellant argued that the claim was barred by the limitation statute and/or that they should be denied relief by reason of laches. Accordingly, they did not have an arguable case with a reasonable chance of success and so were not entitled as complainants to relief. This further argument led the judge to remark that it seemed to him that “the argument turned on an arguable case rather than locus “.

11 At the hearing of the appeal the appellant argued...