Knox v Airports Authority of Trinidad and Tobago and Brown; Knox v Attorney General
| Jurisdiction | Trinidad & Tobago |
| Judge | Harris, J. |
| Judgment Date | 15 November 2013 |
| Neutral Citation | TT 2013 HC 241 |
| Docket Number | H.C.A 1860 of 2000 |
| Court | High Court (Trinidad and Tobago) |
| Date | 15 November 2013 |
High Court
Harris, J.
H.C.A 1860 of 2000
Mr. Frank Peterson for the claimant
Mr. Michael Quamina for the defendants
Damages - Trespass to goods — Wrongful detention of goods — Unlawful seizure of claimant's goods — Whether 2 nd defendant was acting as an independent contractor when it wrongfully levied the claimant's goods — Finding that by disputing the title to the goods and chattels the first defendant acquiesced in and ratified the trespass of the 2nd defendant — Nominal damages — Quantum.
This is a claim at its core, for Damages for trespass to goods including the wrongful detention of the claimant's goods.
The claimant was at all material times the sole owner of the premises situated of #38 Vanda Road Victoria Gardens, Diego Martin. The First defendant is a body corporate established by the Airports Authority Act Chapter 49:02. The Second defendant is a licensed bailiff and was at all material times under the employ of A. V. Knowles and Co. Ltd.
The First defendant, having been awarded costs against the claimant's common law husband, Oswald Downes, in a High Court Action instructed Messrs. A. V. Knowles & Company to levy certain goods, belonging to Mr. Downes to recover the costs awarded. (HCA 2877 of 1995)
On 11th February 2000 around 6:30 am, the Second defendant accompanied by a Marshal's Assistant entered the claimant's premises that she shared with Mr. Downes, and unlawfully seized certain goods, belonging to the claimant instead of that of Mr. Downes. The claimant informed the Second defendant that the goods were her property however the Second defendant proceeded to remove the goods from the house.
By notice dated 181b February 2000 the Marshal informed the First defendant that the claimant had claimed the seized goods and requested that the First defendant admit or dispute the title of the goods. By notice dated 18th February 2000 addressed to the Marshal, Attorney at Law for the First defendant disputed the title of Violet Knox to the goods seized by the Marshal.
On 23rd February 2000 the Marshal issued an Interpleader Summons. The matter came before Master Doyle. By Consent order of Master Doyle on 25th May 2000, the seized goods were returned to the claimant. This Order was appealed and determined in favour of the Appellant/claimant. The claimant in the instant matter, being aggrieved commenced proceedings against the Marshall and Airports Authority.
The first claim by the claimant, Ms. Knox, was commenced in the year 2000(HCA 1860 of 2000) by way of Writ of Summons under the Rules of the Supreme Court 1975(“R5C1975) against the Airports Authority and the Court's Marshall, one, Ronald Brown. A second action (CV2009- 00297) by Ms. Knox was commenced in 2009 against the Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago alone. The facts and causes of action substantially overlap between the two actions. The two matters were consolidated by order of the Court on the 29th June 2009. The action against the Marshall was disposed of following certain interlocutory proceedings [See Court Order of the 17th December 2009]. The 1 st defendant (now intituled as the Attorney General) is the only remaining defendant. The Attorney General filed a defence in the consolidated matter by leave of the Court [See Court Order of the 26th October 2009].
The evidence for the claimant is the only evidence in this matter.
The claimant claims that she was put to great embarrassment and inconvenience in that the levied goods were necessary for the use and enjoyment of her domestic life. In that regard she ought to be compensated. She further contends that the First defendant is vicariously liable for the actions of the Second defendant as at all material times the Second defendant was agent/servant/nominee of the First defendant.
The First defendant on the other hand contends that their instructions to A. V. Knowles and Co. Ltd were to levy distress on the goods and chattels of Oswald Downes and not the claimant. The Second defendant acted as an independent contractor when he wrongfully levied the claimant's goods, and thus the First defendant is not vicariously liable for the loss and damage consequent upon the Marshall's unlawfull actions. Further, the defendant contends that subsequent to the taking of the goods of the claimant, they did not ratify and adopt the acts of the Marshall and are therefore not liable for the trespass or otherwise culpable for the acts of the Marshall. Further still, the defendant contends that even if it is liable, the claimant not having provided values of the goods trespassed upon, is at best entitled to nominal damages only.
The following core issues arise to be determined:
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(i) Whether or not the Second defendant is an independent contractor, thereby excluding the First defendant from any liability;
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(ii) Whether, if the 2nd defendant was an independent contractor, the IS' defendant authorized, ratified and/or adopted the acts of the independent contractor;
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(iii) Whether or not the claimant has proved any of the alleged causes of action and is entitled to any damages.
It is well established that an employer will not be held liable for the actions of an independent contractor. However, it the employer has been negligent in some way, he may be held liable. [See Clerk & Lindsell on Torts Sweet & Maxwell, 19th edn London 2006, 6-52] For example, if he has selected an incompetent contractor or has interfered with the manner of carrying out the work.[Ibid] In Green v. Fibreglass Ltd [1958] 2 All ER 521; see also the plethora of authorities provided by counsel for the 14 defendant in their Submissions] the defendants had hired electrical contractors of good repute to re-wire their offices, the Court held that the defendants were not liable to the plaintiff who had been electrocuted whilst cleaning a room, because the defendants had employed competent electrical contractors thereby discharging the duty owed to the plaintiff.
An employer may also be held jointly liable for the actions of an independent contractor if he has authorised or ratified the independent contractor's work. [See Clerk & Lindsell on Torts supra; see also in Morris v. Salburq (18891 22 QBD 614.]
The First defendant submitted that they hired A.V. Knowles ltd, a well renowned company to collect the debt owed to them by the claimant's common law husband. By letter dated 24th January 2000 the Second defendant, employee of A.V. Knowles informed the First defendant that they would “exercise extreme caution in any attempted levy on household assets” as they were aware that measures had been taken by Mr. Downes to avoid his assets being levied. [See Tab 5 written submissions of the First defendant filed on 23 July 2012]
The fact that the First defendant would have relied on A.V. Knowles' reputation in debt collection, as well as A.V. Knowles' indication that they would be proceeding with extreme caution in levying those goods, in my opinion, initially discharges the First defendant from the duty of care that was owed to the claimant in going in, in execution, initially. Applying the ratio from the Green v. Fibreglass case, it is my view that the First defendant hired an apparent competent contractor, and did not interfere with the manner in which the contractor executed the job, and thereby, subject to whether the 1 st defendant ratified or authorized the taking of the plaintiffs goods, discharged any duty the 1 st defendant owed.
It remains to be decided however, whether the First defendant in any way ratified or authorised the Second defendant's actions. Radha Carrie Maharaj for the defendant, in her witness statement described the facts surrounding the hiring of A. V. Knowles. The instructions were to levy goods belonging to Oswald Downes. The claimants do not dispute this. So from the outset it cannot be said that the First defendant in any way authorised the Second defendant to remove the claimant's property from her home. They simply did not.
It's left to be determined therefore, whether the First defendant ratified the Second defendant's actions after the fact.
After the goods had been levied, the Marshal via notice dated 18th February, requested that the First defendant admit or dispute the claimant's title to the...
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