Haig Community United et Al v Chaguaramas Development Authority
| Jurisdiction | Trinidad & Tobago |
| Judge | Seepersad, J. |
| Judgment Date | 31 July 2015 |
| Neutral Citation | TT 2015 HC 255 |
| Docket Number | CV 2015-02000 |
| Court | High Court (Trinidad and Tobago) |
| Date | 31 July 2015 |
High Court
Seepersad, J.
CV 2015-02000
1. Mr. Blaize and Mr. Masaisai for the claimant
2. Mr. Mendez S.C. and Mr. Quamina instructed by Ms. Troja for the defendant Date of Delivery: 31st July, t 2015
Civil practice and procedure - Application for injunctive relief — Whether there was a serious issue to be tried — Whether damages would have been an adequate remedy — Balance of convenience — Whether the greater risk of injustice lay in granting or refusing the interim injunctive relief sought — Whether the defendant was the owner of the subject parcels of land — Whether the claimants were entitled to the reliefs sought.
Before the Court for its determination is the application filed on the 15th June, 2015 by virtue of which the claimants sought as against the defendant the following reliefs:
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“a. An Interim Injunction restraining the defendants and/or their servants and/or agents from further demolishing the crops on the property of the claimants particularly described as those two parcels of land measuring approximately 40 Hectares or 100 Acres and described as follows:
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I. Parcel 1
Bounded on the NORTH partly by Guave Road and lands occupied by the Water and Sewerage Authority, on the SOUTH by the western main road, on the EAST by Guave Road and on the WEST by Tucker Valley Road and lands occupied by the Water and Sewerage Authority.
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II. Parcel 2
Bounded on the NORTH and EAST by the base of the hill which forms part of the northern range, on the SOUTH partly by Guave Road and partly by the base of the hill that forms part of the northern range and on the WEST by Guave Road.
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Herein after referred to as the subject parcels of land
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b. An Interim Injunction restraining the defendant and/or their servants and/or agents; from constructing any structure whatsoever on the subject parcels of land.
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c. An Interim Injunction restraining the defendant their servants and/or agents or any of them from entering upon and/or remaining upon or about the subject parcels of land.
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d. An Interim Injunction restraining the defendant whether by themselves, their servants and/or agents or howsoever from interfering, harassing and/or molesting and/or in any way threatening the claimant's members.
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e. An Interim Injunction restraining the First and Second defendant individually or by their servant and/or agent from pursuing any conduct which amounts to harassment of the claimant's members.
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f. An Interim Injunction Ordering the defendant their servants and/or agents or any of them do vacate the subject parcels of land.”
The decision of the House of Lords in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] A.C. 396 laid down the tests to be applied by courts when ruling on interim applications on notice for prohibitory injunctions. According to the said case when an application is made for an interlocutory injunction, in the exercise of the Court's discretion, the initial question that falls for consideration is:
“Is there a serious issue to be tried?
If the answer to that question is, “yes”, then two further related questions arise, they are:
Would damages be an adequate remedy for a party injured by the court's grant of or its failure to grant, an injunction?
If not, where does the balance of convenience lie?”
The Court also pointed out that:
“it is no part of the Court ‘s function at this stage of the litigation to try to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavits as to facts on which the claims of either party may ultimately depend nor to decide difficult question of law which call for detailed argument and mature considerations. These are matters to be dealt with at trial”
The Court must consider the nature of the injunction sought by the claimants as well as the purpose for which the injunction has been sought. In the American Cyanamid case (supra) Lord Diplock at page 406 stated as follows:
“To protect the claimant against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial, but the claimant's need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated under the claimant's undertaking in damages if the uncertainty were resolved in the defendant ‘s favour at trial.”
In National Commercial Bank of Jamaica v. Olint Corporation Limited [2009] 1 WLR 1405, 1409, at paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 Lord Hoffman said as follows:
“16… It is often said that the purpose of an interlocutory injunction is to preserve the status quo, but it is of course impossible to stop the world pending trial. The court may order a defendant to do something or not to do something else, but such restrictions on the defendant's freedom of action will have consequences, for him and for others, which a court has to take into account. The purpose of such an injunction is to improve the chances of the court being able to do justice after a determination of the merits at the trial. At the interlocutory stage, the court must therefore assess whether granting or withholding an injunction is more likely to produce a just result. As the House of Lords pointed out in American Cyanamid Co v. Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396, that means that if damages will be an adequate remedy for the plaintiff, there are no grounds for interference with the defendant's freedom of action by the grant of an injunction. Likewise, if there is a serious issue to be tried and the plaintiff could be prejudiced by the acts or omissions of the defendant pending trial and the cross-undertaking in damages would provide the defendant with an adequate remedy if it turns out that his freedom of action should not have been restrained, then an injunction should ordinarily be granted.”
“17…. In practice, however, it is often difficult to ascertain whether either damages or the cross-undertaking will be an adequate remedy but the Court has to consider whether granting or withholding an injunction is more or less likely to cause irremediable prejudice (and to what extent) if it turns out that the injunction should not have been granted or withheld, as the case may be. The basic principle is that the Court should take whichever course seems likely to cause the least irremediable prejudice to one party or the other. This is an assessment in which, as Lord Diplock said in the American Cyanamid (supra):
“It would be unwise to attempt even to list all the various matters which may need to be taken into consideration in deciding where the balance lies, let alone to suggest the relative weight to be attached to them.”
“18…. Among the matters which the court may take into account are the prejudice which the claimant may suffer if no injunction is granted or the defendant may suffer if it is; the likelihood of such prejudice actually occurring; the extent to which it may be compensated by an award of damages or enforcement of the cross-undertaking; the likelihood of either party being able to satisfy such an award; and the likelihood that the injunction will turn out to have been wrongly granted or withheld, that is to say, the court's opinion of the relative strength of the parties' cases.”
De la Bastide CJ in Jetpak Services Ltd v. BWIA International Airways Ltd [1998] 55 WIR 362 stated that focusing exclusively on whether damages were adequate and quantifiable is a far too narrow approach to be taken when considering if an interim injunction should be granted. His lordship pointed out at page 368 that:
“It is a truism that facts are infinitely variable, and it is dangerous to prescribe or apply a single formula for determining whether an interlocutory injunction should be granted in all cases, unless it is expressed in very broad terms.”
De La Bastide CJ went on to state that the Court must go further and ask itself the question “Where does the greater risk of injustice lie, in granting the injunction or in refusing it?”
In treating with this question the learned Chief Justice at page 370 further stated:
If the question is, ‘Wherein lies the greater risk of injustice in granting or in refusing the injunction?, then it becomes apparent that it is not possible to treat (as the judge did) the strength of the plaintiffs case as irrelevant, more so in circumstances like these where: (a) an injunction is sought to enforce a contract which is likely to have expired before the trial, and (b) where the injunction is mandatory in its effect, if not its form.
With regard to head (a), it was recognised by the Court of Appeal in Lansing Linde Ltd v. Kerr [1991] 1 All ER 418 that when an interlocutory injunction was sought to enforce an obligation that was likely to come to an end before there was a trial, some assessment of the merits more than merely that there was a serious issue to be tried, was required and the plaintiff must show a likelihood of success at the trial.
With regard to head (b), Hoffmann J in the Films Rover International case explained the difference in approach that should be adopted where the interlocutory injunction sought is mandatory. He explained that the greater risk of injustice which was likely to be created by the grant of such an injunction meant that such an injunction would not be granted unless the court felt ‘a high degree of assurance’ that the plaintiff would be able to establish his right at a trial. He concluded therefore that essentially the same test should be applied in the case of both mandatory and prohibitory interlocutory injunctions, that is which carried the higher risk of injustice: granting or refusing it?
If the matter is approached in this way, it is pellucidly clear...
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