Douglas v The State
| Jurisdiction | Trinidad & Tobago |
| Judge | Persaud, J.A. |
| Judgment Date | 11 April 1986 |
| Neutral Citation | TT 1986 CA 8 |
| Docket Number | Criminal Appeal No. 5 of 1986 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Trinidad and Tobago) |
| Date | 11 April 1986 |
Court of Appeal
Persaud, J.A.
Criminal Appeal No. 5 of 1986
Desmond Allum for the appellant.
Lloyd Skinner for the respondent.
Criminal law - Bail — Appellant convicted on two counts of robbery with aggravation and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment with hard labour on each count — Appeal filed and appellant applied for bail pending hearing and determination of the appeal — His ground was that the trial took place some 8 years after the circumstances which led to his conviction and that it was unlikely that the appeal would be heard for 18 months, that his protracted incarceration would cause hardship to his wife who was unemployed, that conditions in the remand yard where he was being held were repulsive to him and contrary to his religious beliefs — Cases dealing with bail applications reviewed and circumstances under which a court will grant bail reviewed — Appellant's reasons not sufficient to warrant granting of bail — Application refused.
On January 14, 1986, the appellant was convicted before a judge and jury at the Port of Spain Assizes on two counts of robbery with aggravation and was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment with hard labour on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. On January 17, he filed a notice of appeal against both conviction and sentence. He now applies for bail pending the hearing and determination of the appeal, which he says (with some justification having regard to the length of time it takes for the preparation of records of appeal) is unlikely to be heard for another eighteen months. The trial itself took place some 8 years after the occurrence of the circumstances which led up to his conviction. Need I repeat the observations I have been making from time to time for ever so long - this is a most unsatisfactory state of affairs, and the system now in place for the conduct of criminal cases both at the preliminary stage and at the trial itself, ought to be looked into with a view to improvement. By whatever standard, the length of time to bring alleged offenders to trial inordinately long. It is small wonder that atfer such great lapse of time, the evidence called by the prosecution is, due to the inability of witnesses to recall events with any degree of accuracy, of such a nature that courts are driven to direct acquittals when, on the evidence led at the preliminary enquiry when memories are fresher, accused persons who should be convicted are acquitted. I imagine the reverse can also occur.
Sec. 48(2) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, (Chap.4:01) provides that the Court of Appeal may, if it seems fit, admit an appellant to bail pending the determination of his appeal.
Before dealing with the arguments adduced on behalf of the appellant, there are one or two observations I must make regarding the general principles governing the granting bail to an appellant who has been convicted of a criminal offence. While bail is a matter for the discretion of the judge, there must be exceptional circumstances before it is granted, and an application for bail is not likely to succeed unless supported by strong grounds of appeal. In this case grounds of appeal have been filed and much of the appellant(s argument turned on those grounds as they relate to the evidence of one Carol Peters who was the victim of one of the offences, and who according to the appellant, identified him at the trial when she had given no such information to the police nor did she give that evidence at the preliminary enquiry. But more of this later.
Counsel has referred to number of Carribean cases in support of the application, but before considering them, I would like to refer to cases heard in the court of Criminal Appeal in England dealing with the question of bail.
In the instant application, the appellant has argued that he has been advised that because of the delay (to which I have already adverted)which attends the availability of the trial judge's notes of evidence and the summing up, it is unlikely that his appeal would be heard within the next eighteen months. In R v. Macdonald (21 Crim. App. R.26), that appellant who was convicted of receiving stolen property, and sentences to eighteen months imprisonment, was allowed bail in view of the interval before the hearing of the appeal.
In R v. Charavanmuttu (21 Crim. App. R.184), the appellant who was convicted for indecent assault, and gross indecency with male persons, and sentenced to twelve months’ imprisonment. In order to enable the appellant to consult his legal advisers who were in London, and because of the Christmas vacation, he was granted bail. There were substantial grounds of appeal, the principal one being lack of corroboration, and the prosecution offered no objection to bail.
In R v. Newbery and Elman (23 Crim. App. R.66) the appellants were convicted of conspiracy to defraud and obtaining money by false pretences, and sentenced to two and three years’ imprisonment respectively. In view of the complexity of the case (there were 681 exhibits), the intervening long vacation, and the fact that the Crown did not actually oppose bail, each appellant was granted bail in the sum of (5,000, together with two sureties in each case, in the sum of (2,500 apiece.
In R v. Harding et al (23 Crim. App. R.143), the court, following R. v. Charavanmuttu (supra) granted bail as the Christmas vacation intervened.
In R v. Elien (23 Crim. App. R. 173), the appellant was convicted after a twelve day trial of receiving monies in circumstances amounting to a misdemeanour, anal sentenced to twenty-one months’ imprisonment. He had been on bail before the trial. The application was refused, the Lord Chief Justice holding the view that there were no exceptional circumstances.
In R v. Wise (17 Crim. App. R. 17), the appellant was convicted of arson, and sentenced to three years’ penal servitude. Bail was refused on the ground that there was not the faintest prospect of success on appeal. This case is relevant having regard to the arguments advanced in the instant application.
In R v. Duke of Leinster (17 Crim. App. R. 147), the court repeated that bail will not be granted unless there are exceptional, and unusual reasons. The language used in R v. Starkie (24 Crim. App. R.1) was similar. Swift J. said this (at p.2):–
“It has never been the practice of this court to grant bail to an applicant after he has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment unless in very exceptional circumstances. The mere fact of the existence of the Long Vacation is not of itself such an exceptional circumstance as to justify the allowing of bail”.
In R v. Taran [(1947) Times, 16 December], bail was granted on the ground that the length of the transcript of the shorthand notes of the trial would mean that the appeal would probably not be heard until the expiration of the sentence. This is unlikely to happen in the case before me, assuming it takes 18 months to come on for trial, the appellant having been sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment on the 14th January, 1986.
Emerging from the cases referred to above are indications of the matters which, subject to the rule that only in very exceptional circumstances will bail be granted, a court may take into account. These are - (a) the complexity of the case; (b) the gravity of the offence, (c) the intervening period between conviction and the...
To continue reading
Request your trial