Daniel v The State
| Jurisdiction | Trinidad & Tobago |
| Judge | John J.A |
| Judgment Date | 16 March 2007 |
| Neutral Citation | TT 2007 CA 10 |
| Docket Number | Criminal Appeal No. 34 of 2005 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Trinidad and Tobago) |
| Date | 16 March 2007 |
Court of Appeal
Hamel-Smith, C.J. (Ag.); John, J.A.; Weekes, J.A.
Criminal Appeal No. 34 of 2005
Mr. Bindra Dolsingh and Mr. John Heath for the appellant.
Mr. Roger Gaspard for the State.
Criminal practice and procedure - Directions to jury — Whether trial judge minimised jury's ability to consider whether appellant had lack of intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm — Aggregate effect of directions was that jury must have turned their minds to element of intention — Whether appellant was deprived of alternative of manslaughter — Trial judge gave accurate directions to the jury — Appeal dismissed — Conviction and sentence affirmed.
John J.A Marcus Jason Daniel (“the appellant”) and another person were charged with the murder of Suzette Gibson (“the deceased”, his cousin) which occurred at Blue Basin, Diego Martin on the 23rd January 2002. On the 14th December 2005, after a trial at the Port of Spain Assizes they were convicted of murder and sentenced to death.
Before considering the grounds of appeal we shall deal with the evidence in the case. The prosecution's case was that the deceased who was then 16 years old, left her parents' home at Carenage Road, Diego Martin, on the 23rd January 2002 to attend a dance class. It was customary for her to return home by 9:30 p.m., but on that day she failed to return.
Alvin Gibson, the deceased's father testified that he went in search of her. In the course of the search he met the appellant and his co-accused. He informed them of the situation and the appellant told him that he had seen the deceased at around 3:00 p.m. earlier that day.
Mr. Gibson observed that the appellant's right hand was bandaged and inquired of him what had happened. The appellant's response was that earlier in the day he had gone to look for the deceased as he knew she had dance classes. He did not see her and entered a telephone booth on the boulevard to make a telephone call when a man approached him and asked to use the phone. He told the man to wait and that seemed to anger the man who then attacked him with a knife. A struggle ensued and he sustained a cut on his hand. The appellant further told him that he did not know his attacker and had not reported the matter to the police.
Mr. Gibson then asked the appellant to borrow his vehicle to go and look for the deceased. The appellant obliged and he and his co-accused accompanied Mr. Gibson. They left the yard at around 11:30 p.m. and drove to the home of Ms. Gooding, the deceased's dance instructor, but she was not at home. They searched throughout Diego Martin and some parks but they were unsuccessful in locating her.
At 12:45 a.m. on the 24th January 2002, Mr. Gibson retuned to the home of the deceased's dance teacher with the appellant and his co-accused and she took them to the home of another dance teacher in Diego Martin. They then visited the homes of some students in the dance class, but no useful information was obtained.
At about 6:00 a.m. that morning, Mr. Gibson, Ms. Gooding, the appellant and the co-accused conducted another search, using the appellant's vehicle. While proceeding along the Diego Martin Highway the appellant pointed to a white vehicle travelling in the opposite direction, and instructed Mr. Gibson to turn around and follow the vehicle as he believed he had seen the vehicle trailing them the previous night. Mr. Gibson complied but after speaking with the driver of that vehicle he continued his search for the deceased.
One Sheldon Linton visited the Gibson's home on the morning of the 24th January 2002 and spoke to the deceased's mother. As a result of the conversation they both went to the West End Police Station where Mr. Linton told the police of certain observations he had made concerning his motor vehicle which he had lent the appellant the previous evening. The police inspected the vehicle.
At around 12:45 p.m., Mr. Gibson, the appellant and his co-accused went to the West End Police Station. There, Mr. Gibson spoke to Cpl. Gosine who requested to speak with the appellant and co-accused. Mr. Gibson left both men at the station and continued his search, using the appellant's vehicle.
Sometime thereafter, Corporal Gosine spoke to Inspector Olivierre and they both examined the vehicle which was parked on the compound of the Police Station.
Inspector Olivierre and Corporal Gosine interviewed the co-accused who provided them with vital information concerning the death of the deceased. The officers, together with the co-accused went to Blue Basin. There, the co-accused directed them to an area where they found the deceased's body and observed that it bore multiple injuries.
The co-accused then led Inspector Olivierre and the police party to Brunton Road, Diego Martin where they recovered two knives. The appellant later dictated a cautionary statement to the complainant in the presence of a Justice of the Peace.
In the statement, the appellant admitted to slitting the throat of the deceased and stabbing her. He attributed those acts to a demon which arose inside his head after he had indulged in drugs and alcohol and had listened to heavy rock music. He also identified one of the knives as the weapon he used to kill the deceased. His co-accused also gave a cautionary statement to the police.
According to the forensic pathologist, the deceased died as a result of multiple stab and incised wounds.
The appellant gave evidence on oath. He said that on the material day he had glimpsed the deceased disembarking a taxi at around 4:00 p.m. He then went home and drank rum and listened to rock music. At about 6:00 p.m. that evening, he borrowed the vehicle of a customer- Sheldon Linton and picked up his co-accused and they drank rum and smoked cigarettes. Then he went, by himself, to pick up the deceased. She sat in the back seat and he picked up his co-accused once again, who sat in the front seat.
He drove around for a while, and then parked the vehicle in Blue Basin. He then drank some more and then “started getting in to the rock music”. He and his co-accused reclined their car seats and he touched the deceased's shoulder but she promptly slapped his hand away. He said “that is when the demon thing raise in me. Then I started choking her for about ah minute and ah half…Then I pull her against me and…I take a knife and slit her throat …and … started stabbing her in her chest and stomach”. He said that afterwards he slit the fingers on his right hand and his co-accused hid the knives in the bushes at Brunton Road. He further testified that he was remorseful and did not intend to murder the deceased and attributed it to the demon in his head.
Under cross-examination, he said that he did not realise that he was stabbing the deceased and that in his statement he only spoke of taking a knife and slitting her throat after the officers had told him that they had found her with her throat slit and he realised that what he was seeing and stabbing was the deceased.
He acknowledged that he did not speak of seeing a dark object in his confession statement, but maintained that he did see a dark object on the material night and was ‘high’ on drugs-marijuana and cocaine and drink. He said that he did not recall how long he observed the dark object. In cross-examination, he said that when he choked her there was no dark image in front of him.
Mr. Dolsingh filed five grounds of appeal on behalf of the appellant.
The learned trial judge in his directions diminished or minimised the jury's ability to consider whether the appellant had the lack of intention to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm.
Counsel submitted that, in light of the appellant's defence that he did not intend to commit the act, there were two issues for the jury to determine namely, whether the appellant had the intention simpliciter and secondly whether that intention manifested itself in him killing the deceased. In relation to the first issue, counsel submitted that the trial judge wrongly directed the jury that they could use the appellant's previous experiences with drugs and drink to show that he had an intention to kill on the occasion in question. Counsel submitted that in relation to the second issue, the trial judge failed to direct the jury that if the appellant had the intention to kill then that may not have been directed towards the deceased at all but may have been intended for the demonic dark image. Therefore, he said, the jury was left with the impression that intention simpliciter was equivalent to an intention to kill the deceased, which was wrong. Additionally, Mr. Dolsingh contended that the judge compounded his error by telling the jury that there was no evidence that the appellant was being attacked by a demon or “no satanic offering at the altar”, and had basically crippled the appellant's defence when he told them that the appellant was obviously a “weirdo”.
Moreover, the trial judge's direction to the jury that they ought to consider whether the appellant stabbed the deceased under the influence of alcohol and drugs was incomplete, as the appellant's defence was that it was the combination of alcohol, drugs and the delusion of the demon image which caused him to act as he did, with the delusion being the decisive factor in his actions.
Counsel further submitted that the trial judge in dealing with the issue of intention directed and marshalled the evidence in such a manner as to deprive the jury of their responsibility to decide whether the appellant had the necessary intention to kill. This was highlighted in the judge's direction to the jury when he said that based on the type of knife they could conclude that he had the “presence of mind” to use it in the way he did, and possessed it not simply to peel...
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