Church of Spiritual Metaphysics v Brown

JurisdictionTrinidad & Tobago
CourtHigh Court (Trinidad and Tobago)
JudgeBoodoosingh, J.
Judgment Date21 June 2016
Neutral CitationTT 2016 HC 246
Docket NumberCV 2005 – 00553
Date21 June 2016

High Court

Boodoosingh, J.

CV 2005 – 00553

Church of Spiritual Metaphysics
and
Brown
Appearances:

Mr. Ernest Koylass SC leading Ms Debbie Roopchand for the claimant

Mr. Prem Persad-Maharaj and Mr. Stephen Boodram for the defendant

Property law - Contempt of court — Occupation of property — Construction on the property without consent — Consent order — Requirements of parties under consent order — Intention of parties under agreement — Use and occupation of property — Distinction between possession and occupation.

Boodoosingh, J.
1

This is a contempt of court application and an application to construe a consent/declaratory order previously entered before a now retired judge. The claimant is a church incorporated by an Act of Parliament. In 2005 the claimant brought this claim against the defendant for a declaration that the claimant was entitled to the use and occupation of a piece of land comprising half lot being part of Lot 22 Springvale Village, Forres Park tenanted by Samuel Toby from Caroni (1975) Limited. The claimant was also seeking that the defendant break a galvanize fence erected on the land and an injunction restraining the defendant and her agents from entering and/or remaining on the said lands. Damages for trespass were also sought.

2

The church carries on a place of worship on the lands. They asserted that Samuel Toby had given permission to the claimant to construct a building on the half lot in about 1947. Samuel Toby was the minister of the church. His wife Iris Toby was the “mother” of the Church. She carried it on. After some disagreements, Charles Toby, the son of Samuel Toby, took over as the minister.

3

A building was constructed and a room used as a “Mourning Ground” was constructed to the back. This was of tapia material, then later of plastered bricks with galvanize sheets covering. In 2004 they began repairs to the mourning room.

4

The defendant is the successor to Iris Toby. She is Iris' granddaughter. Iris left her property to her. She has since obtained the tenancy of the land from the successor to Caroni Limited.

5

The Defence filed in January 2006 asserted that the use of the land was under a licence and consent was needed. The defendant said the licence was terminated in January 2006. The defendant counterclaimed for possession.

6

This matter progressed before Stollmeyer J. Witness statements were filed on both sides. On the day of the trial on 11 October 2006, a consent / declaratory order was entered as follows:

IT IS BY CONSENT ORDERED AND DECLARED:

By way of compromise of the respective claims of the Parties hereto that the claimant is entitled to the use and occupation of All and Singular that piece or parcel of land comprising Half lot more or less forming part of Lot 099 Tenant No: 22, Springvale Forres Park and shown on the Plan hereto annexed and marked “A” as the shaded portion (hereinafter called “the said Lands”) for as long as it likes.

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:–

  • 1. That the defendant whether by herself, her servant and/or agents do within 48 hours break and remove all that wood and galvanize fence erected by the defendant on the said land.

  • 2. That the claimant be at liberty to construct the Mourning Room as shown on the plan hereto annexed and marked “A” which when constructed shall leave a space of at least 6 ft from the Eastern boundary of lot 099 for the defendant's use.

  • 3. That any further construction work to be done on the said land by the claimant, to be done only after obtaining the consent of the defendant such consent not to be unreasonably withheld; and

  • 4. That there be no order as to Costs.

  • 5. Liberty to apply.

  • 6. Claimant's Attorney to write up this order.

7

On 13 August 2010 an order for contempt was applied for by the defendant against certain servants/agents of the claimant on account of their constructing a chain-link wire fence on the property without the consent of the defendant; carrying out construction work without the consent of the defendant; re-wiring the electrical system, changing the roof and installing floor tiles and a ceiling without the consent of the defendant; carrying out construction at night causing a nuisance and by conducting services outside of the times indicated by their sign board; and making loud noises.

8

Affidavits were filed on both sides. The matter was adjourned on several occasions over a long period of time for the parties to talk and try to work out their differences given the fact that they were both not going anywhere and they would continue to occupy their respective properties in close proximity on the same lot and that they needed to find a mechanism to peacefully co-exist.

9

The attorneys commendably tried various measures, met with the parties, undertook a site visit etc. However, these failed to arrive at any compromise position.

10

We thus came to the point of both sides filing written submissions in respect of the construction of the order of Stollmeyer J and to determining what were the entitlements of the respective parties under the terms of the order and whether contempt was made out.

11

In Leo Abrahams v. Doll Basdeo, Civil Appeal No. 74 of 2012, unreported, delivered 13 November 2015, Mendonca JA outlined the approach to be taken when construing a consent order. He said:

“The Court's role in interpreting an order is to discover and give effect to the intention of the Court. The order must be interpreted objectively. The approach is broadly to apply the principles of statutory interpretation. The starting point is the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used in light of the syntax, context and background in which the words were used (see Feld v. Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2014] EWHC 1383).”

12

Further the learned Justice of Appeal said:

  • “40. In interpreting an order of the Court, as I mentioned, the object is to ascertain the intention of the Court. The order is to be interpreted objectively. The starting point is the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used in the light of the context, syntax and background in which the words are used. It is therefore relevant to note that the word “in” used in the 2002 order can quite properly support the wider construction contended for by the respondent as among the possible meanings of the word is “concerned or involved with” (see Collins English Dictionary(7th ed) and “with respect to” (see the Oxford Paperback Dictionary (4th ed.)

  • 41. As background is relevant, it was appropriate for Counsel for the respondent to invite the Court to look at the affidavit that was before Best, J. when he made the order in 2002. It will also be appropriate to consider not only the affidavit but the application as well. That was made by summons before Best, J. It sought an order in the terms which the Judge made. The application therefore invited the Judge to make an order in terms of the summons. Although in construing a Court order the concern is with the intention of the Court in a case such as this where the Court makes an order in terms of a draft prepared by attorneys for the applicant who alone was present at the hearing it is also appropriate to consider what the applicant's attorneys could reasonably have intended in drafting the order in the way they did as far as that might be objectively determined on the evidence.”

13

In Foskett on the Law of Compromise 6th ed at para 5-02 the learned author stated:

“Subsequent to the conclusion of a compromise, questions may arise as to its meaning and effect. This can occur even when those with the highest calibre of legal expertise have been responsible for the drafting of the agreement. The task is to ascertain the common intention of the parties by construing the agreement.”

14

In Investors Compensation Scheme Limited v. West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 W.L.R. 896 Lord Hoffman at p. 912-913 stated:

“My Lords, I will say at once that I prefer the approach of the judge. But I think I should preface my explanation of my reasons with some general remarks about the principles by which contractual documents are nowadays construed. I do not think that the fundamental change which has overtaken this branch of the law, particularly as a result of the speeches of Lord Wilberforce in Prenn v. Simmonds [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1381, 1384-1386 and Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. Yngvar Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 W.L.R. 989, is always sufficiently appreciated. The result has been, subject to one important exception, to assimilate the way in which such documents are interpreted by judges to the common sense principles by which any serious utterance would be interpreted in ordinary life. Almost all the old intellectual baggage of “legal” interpretation has been discarded. The principles may be summarized as follows.

  • (1) Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract.

  • (2) The background was famously referred to by Lord Wilberforce as the “matrix of fact,” but this phrase is, if anything, an understated description of what the background may include. Subject to the requirement that it should have been reasonably available to the parties and to the exception to be mentioned next, it includes absolutely anything which would have affected the way in which the language of the document would have been understood by a reasonable man.

  • (3) The law excludes from the admissible background the previous negotiations of the parties and their declarations of subjective intent. They are admissible only in an action for rectification. The law makes this distinction for reasons of practical policy and, in this respect only, legal interpretation differs from the way we would...

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