Chootoo and Others v Joseph

• Jurisdiction: Trinidad & Tobago
• Judge: Fraser, J.A.
• Judgment Date: 15 March 1971
• Neutral Citation: TT 1971 CA 10
• Docket Number: P.C.C. App. No. 12 of 1970
• Court: Court of Appeal (Trinidad and Tobago)
• Date: 15 March 1971

Court of Appeal

McShine, C.J.; Fraser, J.A.; de la Bastide, J.A

P.C.C. App. No. 12 of 1970

Chootoo & Ors.

and

Joseph

Appearances

Mr. R.B. Ramkeesoon appeared for the appellants.

Mr. E. Maundy appeared for the respondent.

Real Property - Landlord and tenant — Tenant at Will

Fraser, J.A.

1 A Petty Civil Court judge held the appellants were tenants at will and found that since 1948 they occupied a building situated on a parcel of land claimed by the respondent. It seems that he did not consider it necessary to examine closely the possible date of occupation because he accepted the evidence of the appellant that occupation commenced in 1948 when she got married although it was suggested by counsel for the respondent that occupation had commenced in 1951. We mentioned this merely to point out that the documentary evidence disclosed that the building was purchased by the appellants from Bim Bim Chootoo on July 1, 1951, according to a receipt, which came from the custody of the appellants. However, it does not appear to be a matter of great moment whether the Petty Civil Court judge held occupation to have commenced in 1951 or in 1948. The finding, which is material for the purpose of this appeal is whether the appellants were tenants-at-will.

2 A tenancy at will is a personal relationship between the original landlord and tenant, and is determined by the death of either of them by a conveyance of the reversion - see Hill and Redman's Law of Landlord and Tenant. It is not immediately necessary to mention the case of Morton v Woods, (1869) 4 L.R. Q.B. 293 although we shall come back to that case a little later. We desire to state immediately what the position is with regard to the termination of a tenancy at will because it was the point upon which counsel for the appellants solely vested this arguments. He submitted that there was no evidence that anyone ever determined the tenancy-at-will. Relying upon the case of Morton v. Woods, he said that neither a personal representative of Moonia nor of Bim Bim Chootoo ever at any time demanded possession and although the respondent claimed that after his purchase in 1964 he asked for possession the inference which should be drawn is that possession was not requested before the expiration of the period of prescription which was said to be 1965.

3 Section 3 of the Real Property Limitation Ordinance Ch.5 No.7 prescribes a period of 16 years within which a claim may be made for the recovery of possession of land commencing from the time when the right of the claimant had accrued. Section 8 of the Ordinance deals specifically with tenancy-at-will and prescribes that a person who claims possessions of land, which is the subject of a tenancy-at-will may only within 16 years after the expiration of a year from the commencement of the tenancy-at-will. The difference between the two sections is that whereas in s.3 the period is 16 years from the time of the accrual of the right, in s.8 it is 17 years from the commencement of tenancy-at-will.

4 This case is not without some interest. On the facts found by the Petty Civil Court judge the appellants went into possession of the house as tenants-at-will through Bim Bim Chootoo in 1948. On June 18, 1949, Chootoo conveyed the property to Moonia for her life with reversion to himself in fee simple. Actually he had not conveyed the reversion; but instead retained the reversion and the conveyance to Moonia was only for a life interest. Consequently, when Moonia died in 1957 Chootoo reverted as absolute owner. It is at that point in time that the judge of the Petty Civil Court held to have accrued Chootoo's right to claim. On this point he was wrong. Indeed, if 1948 was held to be the year in which the appellants' possession commenced then Chootoo's right to claim commenced in 1949, and because he had not conveyed the reversion but had retained it himself the right to claim would have subsisted for 16 years thereafter. He died on March 31, 1962, and ordinarily the law as to determination of a tenancy-at-will must apple. In this case the effect would be that the tenancy-at-will determined on the day of his death on March 31, 1962.

5 We now advert to the case of Morton v Woods. What is important to note about Morton v Woods, is that it was a case which involved a conveyance by the mortgagor to a second mortgagee of an interest in the land while the mortgagor remained in possession. A term new mortgage prescribed a period of occupation of ten years. The case was heard before a judge of the Queen's Bench and then on appeal to the Exchequer Chamber where the judgment was delivered...